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The Aviation Safety/Automation Program Conference - 1989 was sponsored by the
NASA Langley Research Center on 11-12 October 1989. The conference, held at the
Sheraton Beach Inn and Conference Center, Virginia Beach, Virginia, was chaired by
Samuel A. Morello and coordinated by the Science and Technology Corporation (STC)
Meetings Division.
The primary objective of the conference was to ensure effective communication and
technology transfer by providing a forum for technical interchange of current
operational problems and program results to date. The Aviation Safety/Automation
Program has as its primary goal to improve the safety of the national airspace system
through the development and integration of human-centered automation technologies
for aircraft crews and air traffic controllers. Specific objectives include the
development of the basis (consisting of philosophies and guidelines) for applying
human-centered automation to the flight deck and ATC controller station; human-
centered automation concepts and methods for flight crews, which will ensure full
situation awareness; and human-centered automation concepts and methods for ATC
controllers which allow integration and management of information and air-ground
communications. The effects of human error, the loss of situation awareness, the
handling of system contingencies, and the capability of air and ground systems to cope
with increasing traffic and schedule demands are technical issues being addressed in this
effort.
This document has been compiled to record the conference presentations, which
provided the stimulus for technical interchange. The presentation charts contained
herein also document the status of on-going research and future plans of the Aviation
Safety/Automation Program.
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o Prerequisites for Success
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY





o Operators, Maintainers, Managers
o Responsible for Operational Objectives
o Should be"ln Charge"
DESIGN OBJECTIVES
Support humans to achieve operational objectives
for which they are responsible
o Enhance Human Abilities
o Overcome Human Limitations
o Foster User Acceptance
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DESIGN ISSUES
o Formulating the Right Problem
o Designing an Appropriate Solution
o Developing It to Perform Well
o Assuring User Satisfaction
DESIGN PROCESS
o Measurement Issues
o A Framework for Measurement
o Typlcal Measurement Problems
o Case Studies
MEASUREMENT ISSUES
Viability _* Are the Benefits of System Use Sufficiently
Greater than its Costs?
Acceptance--. Do Organlzations/Individuals Use the
System?
Validation---. Does the System Solve the Problem?
Evaluation-- i, Does the System Meet Requirements?
Demonstration+How Do Observers React to System?
Verification_-_ Is the System Put Together as Planned?





A FRAMEWORK FOR MEASUREMENT
.............. ........ '".......FEASIBILITY....,.-"
° o.-'"'" ,.,°.- ................. ....°°
__. ......" :'"" TECHNOLOGY'""-






o Planning Too Late
o Executing Too Early
NATURALIST PHASE
o Understanding Users' Domain and Tasks
O Assessing Roles of Individual, Organization,
Environment
o Developing Formal Description of Users
o Identifying Barriers/Avenues for Change
METHODS AND TOOLS FOR MEASUREMENTS







o Deslgn Information System
o Design Tool
MARKETING PHASE
o Introducing Product Concepts
o Planning for Validity, Acceptability, Viability
































O Trading Off Conceptual Functionality vs.
Technological Reality
o Application of Design Methodologies
o Inherent Conflict Between Design and Evaluation
o Efficient Choices of Methods and Measures
EVOLUTIONARY ARCHITECTURES
o Level A: What you know you can do.
o Level B: What you are willing to promise.
o Level C: What you would like to do.
o Principle: Conceptual architecture should be capable of
potentially supporting all three levels.
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SALES AND SERVICE PHASE





o Flexible Design Process
o Long-Term Perspective
o Sense of Accountability




AUTOMATED FLIGHT DECKS AND
CONTROLLER WORKSTATIONS:
PHILOSOPHY AND ISSUES
Human-Centered Automation: Operational Experience
(Acknowledgment of Oral Presentations)
Vic Britt-- Northwest Airlines
Wayne Bundrick -- Delta Airlines
Cliff Lawson -- United Airlines Flight Center




BOEING FLIGHT DECK DESIGN
PHILOSOPHY
Harty Stoll
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company
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FLIGHT MANAGEMENT COMPUTER & MAP
AUTOMATED MONITORING








_ (HIGH REUABIUTY)DIGITAL ELECTRONICS_
GAIRLINE WORKING
FLIGHT DECK DESIGN GOALS
747-400
THE DESIGN OF THE 747 FLIGHT DECK IS BASED ON THE RECENT SUCCESSFUL
757/767 PROGRAMS AS WELL AS ON THE EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM MILLIONS OF
FLIGHT HOURS ON BOEING COMMERCIAL JET TRANSPORTS. SPECIAL EMPHASIS IS
PLACED ON THE LATEST DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND CONTROL/DISPLAY INTEGRATION
TO PROVIDE UNCLUTTERED INSTRUMENT PANELS, IMPROVED REACH AND SCAN
CAPABILITY, AND OPTIMIZED CREW WORKLOAD. THE RESULT IS ENHANCED SAFETY




• IMPROVED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
• PERFORMANCE/WORKLOAD OPTIMIZATION
• INCREASED RELIABILITY/MAINTAINABILITY
• REDUCED OPERATING COST
• IMPROVED CREW COMFORT
• DIGITAL COMPUTERS/MICROPROCESSORS
• INTEGRATED DISPLAYS
• INTEGRATED FLIGHT MANAGEMENT
• CDU's
• LASER GYRO INERTIAL REFERENCE
• ADVANCED SYSTEM MONITORING
• CENTRAL MAINTENANCE SYSTEM WITH
STANDARDIZED BITE







• FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION
• COMPETITIVE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURE
• SYMPOSIUMS
• WORKSHOPS






• ALPA, IFALPA, APA
. MISC. STUDIES (1969 UAL-ALPA)
• ASRS
• MILITARY - AIR FORCE, NAVY, ETC.
• HUMAN FACTOR ORGANIZATIONS
• ACCIDENT/INCIDENT DATA
• BOEING FLIGHT TEST
• CREW TRAINING
• BOEING IR & D
• CUSTOMER SERVICE UNIT
• DATA ON EXISTING BOEING MODELS
• RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY
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• INERTIAL REFERENCE SYSTEMS
ELECTRONIC FLIGHT INSTRUMENT SYMBOL GENERATION
• AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL AND FLIGHT DIRECTOR SYSTEM
• ILS RECEIVERS
DUAL
FLIGHT AND ENGINE INSTRUMENTS
• FLIGHT MANAGEMENT COMPUTER
• NAVIGATION RADIOS
• COMMUNICATION RADIOS
• AIR DATA SYSTEMS
WARNING AND CAUTION ALERTS
AUTOMATION
(WHAT DOES IT MEAN?)
SUBSYSTEM AUTOMATION
REDUCE CREW WORKLOAD (3 TO 2 MAN CREW)
REDUCE CREW ERROR
GLASS COCKPITS












Examples of Accident Data Reviewed
e Subsystem management accidents-worldwide air carriers 1968-1980
Accident Related Cause
• Crew omitted pitot heat
= Wrong position of standby power switch
o Flight engineer and captain conducted
unauthorized troubleshooting
• Electrical power switching not coordinated
with pilots
• Flight engineer shut off ground proximity
• Faulty fuel management
• No leading edge flaps on takeoff
• Confusion over correct spoiler switch
position
• Crewman did not follow pilot's Instruction
• Mismanaged cabin pressure
Design
• Auto on w,th engine start
• Automated standby and essential power
• Simplified systems delete maintenance
functions
• Auto switching and load shedding-no crew
action required
• Shut off on forward panel In full view of both
pilots
• Auto fuel management with alert for low fuel,
wrong configuration, and imbalance
• Improved takeoff warning with digital
computer
• Dual electric spoiler control
• Full-time caution and warning system
• Dual auto system with auto switchover
Allocation of 747-200 Flight Engineer's Duties







































_ LIGHTSAVERAGE 3-CREW GAGESEXISTING JETS SWITCHES
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CREW CAUSED ACCIDENTS VS. AUTOMATION
ALL ACCIDENTS THRU 1988








ATTITUDE, HEADING HOLD. AUTOPtLOT
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FLIGHT MANAGEMENT COMPUTER (DUAL)
LATERAL & VERTICAL NAVIGATION AUTOPILOT
1.49 FULL AUTO SUBSYSTEMS


















CREW OVERUSE REDUCING CREW FALL-BACK CAPABILITY
PILOT TRANSITION IN AND OUT OF AUTOMATIC AIRPLANES
BOREDOM














What is it Really?
• The act of forming, coordinating, or blending into a
functioning or unified whole.
Merriam-Webster
How does integration apply to Cockpit Avionics? ....
PRECE_h_'_G P_GE BLAi_;_ riOT FIL#_ED ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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Benefits of Cockpit Integration
• Reduced pilot work load
• Increased system redundancy
• Increased maintainability
• Greater design flexibility for aircraft manufacturer
• Greater design flexibility for equipment manufacturer
ORIGIflAL PAGE





Flight Deck System (FG/FDS) Overview
Flight Guidance/Flight Deck System
liYSlTM ([is) /1/1t
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MD-11 Flight Guidance/Flight Deck System
Honeywell System Summary
• 44 Line replaceable units (LRUs) per shipset
• 28 Different LRU types
• 48 Microprocessors per shipset
• 8 Different types of processors
• 1.5 Million total words of software
• 175 ARINC 429 type buses
• 8 Different ARINC data protocols








• Develop systems that are safe and meet regulatory agency
requirements
• Develop systems that optimize the operation of the aircraft
- For the pilots - Passengers - Operators - Mechanics
• Develop, test, and certify systems on schedule at a
reasonable cost
- Minimize interface problems
- Reduce on-aircraft development, test, and demonstration
time
- Identify and correct system problems early
Tools and Techniques
• Team approach with airframe manufacturer
- Joint development of system architecture and system
analyses
- Use of combined systems experience-airframe/avionics
• Systems integration organization
- Coordinate top level system design
- Enhance communication internal/external
- Coordinate solutions to common design problems
- Coordinate solutions to problems involving multiple systems
- Perform top level system testing
- Provide flight test and flight operations support
• System level test facilities
- Subsystem test benches
- Subsystem validation facilties (VALFAC)
- Integration validation facility (VALFAC)
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• Level of integration in cockpit avionics has increased
significantly in recent years
• Benefits of integration are readily apparent in modern
aircraft cockpits
• Approach to avionics system design must change in
order to take full advantage of system integration
• Different types of test facilities/test procedures
are required for integrated systems
• Changes in aircraft manufacturer/avionics system
supplier relationship likely 0 '_
RI_Ir,}AL PAGE IS
_w__T_,fav" PA_E OF POOR QUALITY
BLACK APD WHITE PHOTOGRAPH
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Cockpit Avionics Integration
What are the effects on Cockpit Automation? ....
Automation
What is it Really?
• Automatically controlled operation of an apparatus,
process, or system by mechanical or electronic devices
that take the place of human operators.
Merriam-Webster

























MD-11 ASC Hydraulic System Functions
• Pre-flight





-Fault isolation and system reconfiguration
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-Tail fuel management/CG control





























-Air data heaters test




-Cargo fire agent timing
-APU/CFDS interface
-APU shut down, on/off control
• Abnormal
-Pilot heat fault recovery
Cockpit Automation Concerns
• Crew=awareness - does pilot need to know
• Crew work load
• Fail safe design






• Automation is unavoidable
• Automation is beneficial
• Cockpit designs must address operational/
human factors concerns
• Pilot is ultimately responsible for aircraft/
passenger safety. He must be able to do his job.
44
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The systems experience gained from 17 years of DC-10 operation was used during the design of
the MD-11 to automate system operation and reduce crew workload. All functions, from preflight
to shutdown at the termination of flight, require little Input from the crew.
The MD-11 aircraft systems are monitored for proper operation by the Aircraft Systems Controllers
[ASC]. In most cases, system reconflguration as a result of a malfunction Is automated. Manual
input is required for irreversible actions such as engine shutdown, fuel dump, fire agent
discharge, or Integrated Drive Generator (IDG] disconnect. During normal operations, when the
cockpit is configured for flight, all annunciators on the overhead panel will be extinguished. This
"Dark Cockpit" Immediately confirms to the crew that the panels are correctly configured and
that no abnormalities are present. Primary systems annunciations are shown In text on the Alert
Area of the Engine and Alert Display (EAD]. This eliminates the need to scan the overhead.
The MD-11 aircraft systems can be manually controlled from the overhead area of the cockpit.
The center portion of the overhead panel is composed of the primary aircraft systems panels,
which include FUEL, AIR, Electrical (ELEC] and Hydraulic [HYD] systems, which are easily accessi-
ble from both flight crew positions. Each aircraft system panel Is designed in such a way that the
left third of the panel controls the No. I system, the center portion controls the No. 2 system, and the
right side controls the No. 3 system. For quick reference, they are lined up directly with the No. 1,
No. 2 and No. 3 engine fire handles. The most used panels are located In the lower forward area
of the overhead; the lesser used panels are in the upper aft area. Each aircraft system panel has a
pictorial schematic of that system on the light plate that symbolically connects the varlous
systems and controls on that panel. This schematic closely resembles the System Synoptic shown
on the Systems Display [SD].
Each Aircraft Systems Controller (ASC) has two automatic channels and a manual mode. Should
the operating automatic channel fail or be shut off by its protection devices, the ASC will automa-
tically select the alternate automatic channel and continue to operate automatically as
required for that particular flight condition (manual selection of the alternate channel is also
possible]. Should both automatic channels fail, the controller will revert to manual operation and
reconfigure the aircraft to a sate condition. The crew would then employ simplified manual pro-
ceclures for the remainder of the flight for that system only.
All rectangular lights are annunciators. All square lights are combined switches and annun-
ciators called switchllights. Red switch/lights on the overhead (Level 3 alerts] are for conditions
requiring immediate crew action. Amber (Level 2 or Level I alerts] indicates a fault or switch out of
position requiring awarness or crew interaction. Overhead switches used in normal operating
conditions will illuminate blue when in use (Level 0 alerts] such as WING ANTI-ICE -- ON.
An overhead switch/light with BLACK LETTERING on an amber or red background indicates a
system failure and that crew interaction is required. A switch/light with blue or amber lettering
and a BLACK BACKGROUND indicates a switch out of normal position and that crew action is
necessary only if the system is in manual operation.
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SECONDARY ENGINE PAGE (ENG)
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SUMMARIZED FAULT DATA
(GENERATOR BUS FAULT CONDITION ILLUSTRATED)
DC-10 CONTROL PANEL
ANNUNCIATOR LIGHTS
R EMER AC BUS OFF FUEL PMP 1 PRESS LO
R EMER DC BUS OFF
DC BUS 3 OFF ENG 3 ANTI ICE DISAG
AC BUS TIE 3 ISOL
AC BUS 3 OFF
GEN 3 OFF
GALLEY POWER OFF
DC-10 CONCEPT RE( IUIRED INTERPRETATION
OF SEVERAL ANNUNCIATIONS TO DETERMINE
"ROOT" CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM
"V"
AC BUS TIE ISOL + AC BUS OFF +
GEN OFF LIGHT ON = GEN BUS FAULT




i GEN BUS 3 FAULT I
ENGINE AND
ALERT DISPLAY (EAD)
PROCEDURAL STEPS REQUIRED TO EXECUTE
THE PROCEDURE (MD-11 AUTO MODE)
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The purpose of this section of the Plan is to establish a development and
implementation strategy plan for improving safety and efficiency in the Air
Traffic Control (ATC) system. These improvements will be achieved through the
proper applications of human factors considerations to the present and future
systems.
The program will have four basic goals:
-prepare for the future system through proper hiring and training.
-develop controller work station team concept (managing human errors).
-understand and address the human factors implications of negative system
results (N_MCs, incursions, etc.).
-define the proper division of responsibilities and interactions between
the human and the machine in ATC systems.
PROGRAM ELEMENTS
This plan addresses six program elements which together address the overall
purpose. The six program elements are
I. Determine principles of human-centered automation that will enhance
aviation safety and the efficiency of the air traffic controller.
2. Provide new and/or enhanced methods and techniques to measure, assess, and
improve human performance in the ATC environment.
3. Determine system needs and methods for information transfer between and
within controller teams and between controller teams and the cockpit.
4. Determine how new controller work station technology can optimally be
applied and integrated to enhance safety and efficiency.
5. Assess training needs and develop improved techniques and strategies for
selection, training, and evaluation of controllers.
6. Develop standards, methods, and procedures for the certification and
validation of human engineering in the design, testing, and implementation of
any hardware or software system element which affects information flow to or
from the human.
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PR__AOEMENT
(Details of program management are yet to be worked out but it appears
obvious that to be effective, the program must be managed in such a way as to
cross all organizational lines. Attached is a paper entitled "Configuration
of the Mind: a concept of Human Factors" which may contain the basic
requirements for the management of this program.)
PROGRAHDESCRIPTIONS
I. AUTOMATION
Program Element. - Determine principles of human-centered automation that
will enhance aviation safety and the efficiency of the air traffic
controller.
Problem. - The proposed introduction of advanced computer-based technology
into the controller work environment will be associated with a dramatic
change in both the role and expertise expected of the controller. To an
increasing degree, the computer will be working from a self generated "plan"
to make recommendations to the controller. The controllers ability and
willingness to accept these decisions while maintaining responsibility for
the separation of aircraft will present major challenges to system designers.
Approach
I. Develop a human centered philosophy of automation by evaluating levels
and degrees of automation as well as alternative automation strategies.
The human as monitor is one extreme while the machine as monitor is the
other.
2. Define the limits to automation tasks. This should include a
determination of when an automated system should be limited due to the
human's inability to comprehend its actions or to take over where
procedures require.
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3. In keeping with the proposed level of humanresponsibility, evaluate
the humanfunctions dynamically as automated system planning evolves.
4. Define function allocation and more explicit criteria for assigning
tasks, and develop quantitative measures.
5. Conduct scientifically valid simulation studies which measurehuman
performance using various automation philosophies (i.e., kind and level of
automation).
Results/Products
I. A methodology for evaluating the effect of alternative levels of
automation on overall human/system performance in a real time simulated
and real time operational environment
2. Guidelines for determining the optimal role of both the controller and
the automation under various conditions
3. Guidelines for warning devices/alerting systems which notify the human
of the failure or partial failure of an automated system
2. HUMAN PERFORMANCE
Program Element. - Provide new and/or enhanced methods and techniques to
measure, assess, and improve human performance in the ATC environment.
Problem. - The existing body of human factors knowledge, data and methods for
assessing and predicting human performance needs to be expanded. Easy to use
and predictive workload measurers are not available.
Approach
I. Investigate and identify the human performance limitations at the ATC
work station. Realistic human performance expectations (including what
can designers realistically expect in human performance, e.g., what is the
required time to respond to an external stimulus?) should be _eveloped.
2. Develop improved methods of measuring controller mental state and
workload criteria.
3. Define the effects on performance of fatigue, disruptive rest/work
cycles, and drugs.
4. Develop fundamental understanding of decision making and means to aid
or improve it in aviation.
5. Define team building methodologies for improved ATC work station




I. Provision of basic tools needed to assess potential problem areas and
evaluate design.
2. Guidelines for work station design, certification, and operating
procedures.
3. Plan for an ATC work station resource management (team building)
program.
3. INFORMATION TRANSFER/CONTROLLER-PILOT INTERFACE
Program Element. - Determine system needs and methods for information
transfer between and within controller teams and between controller teams and
the cockpit.
Problem. - The information requirements of controllers and flight crews in an
increasingly complex aviation system must be specified, and methods developed
for the transfer, management, and integration of this information in ways
which reduce the chance of accident due to human error.
Approach. - The sources and types of information available to and needed by
the controller and flight crew will be identified, classified and
prioritized. Various data entry and display methods will be evaluated in part-
task studies prior to being integrated and validated in full mission
simulations and/or operational evaluations.
Results/Product
I. Prioritized inventory of total information available at the work
station
2. Guidelines for information management
4- CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS
Program Element. - Determine how new controller work station technology can
optimally be applied and integrated to enhance safety and efficiency.
Problem. - Continued engineering development has, and will continue to
provide a technological base to enhance system safety and increase
productivity. Methods of displaying, controlling, and integrating data for
input to and to accept output from the controller must be further developed
to assure proper application.
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A_oproach. - On an ongoing basis, assess the ability of new technology
displays and input devices to enhance the man-machine relationship. As
appropriate, develop projects to
I. Develop new display technology. This includes new methods (e.g.
3D displays), new materials and color enhancements.
2. Improve and standardize ATC display formats, symbology, and
annunciations.
3. Develop data transfer systems that can exchange data between
the aircraft and ground in a timely manner.
4. Explore the use of touch panel inputs as well as voice
recognition.
5. Apply Artificial Intelligence and expert systems into the ATC
work station. Fault analysis and appropriate display to controller should
be included.
Results/Product
1. Fundamental understanding of displays for information transfer
2. Guidelines for design and certification of ATC automation and display
systems
3. Systems to improve the decision making process
5. SELECTION AND TRAINING
Program Element. - Assess training needs and develop improved techniques and
strategies for selection, training, and evaluation of controllers.
Problem. - Current hiring, training, and qualification requirements do not
necessarily take into account the operational environment with new automation
capabilities in the ATC work station and the new training techniques
available. For example, concern has been expressed about the effects of
automation on the controller's traditional skills.
Approach
I. Review fundamental training requirements and assess their
effectiveness in today's and tomorrow's ATC system.
2. Assess the efficacy of ATC work station resource management training
from the perspectives of the present and future needs.
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3. Study the types of training programs which can be developed and/or
utilized to reduce the causal factors in instances of negative system
results.
4. Review controller selection criteria with a view towards appropriate
staffing for future systems.
6. Consider the advantages and disadvantages of ab-initio training.
Results/Product
I. Specific human factors audio/visual and CBI training criteria.
2. Human factors training programs for ATC work station resource
management (team building).
3. Specifications of training program characteristics which lead to
enhanced safety and productivity in the present system and future
systems.
A. Definition of a "potential controller" profile and techniques for
ascertaining its degree in an applicant.
6.CERTIFICATION
Program Element. - Develop standards, methods, and procedures for the
certification and validation of human engineering in the design, testing, and
implementation of any hardware or software system element which affects
information flow to or from the human.
Problem. - The current FAA process does not adequately stress the importance
of and the corresponding need for well founded human factors technology to be
applied throughout the initial design stage of new or modified ATC system
elements. Nor does the current process provide sufficient procedures for
certification of the appropriateness of the input/output of data to/from the
human. Nor are there procedures for certifying task assignments and the
associated information requirements relative to the human.
A_p_proach
I. Develop new certification standards and the means to assess the human
interface with the ATC work stations. Ideans will be developed to allow
evaluation of the effects of the introduction of new systems in the
controller work station. Standards will include issues rela_ing to the
intermixing of old and new systems as well as transition strategies.
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2. Develop standards which assure that humanfactors considerations are
properly incorporated in the existing configuration managementprocess.
Results/Product. - Recommended additions to the existing configuration
management system which require appropriate human factors consideration for
any new or changed system element which affects the human input, output, or
data processing.
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CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT OF THE _._ND:
A Concept of Human Factors
We in the FAA have been wrestling for a long time with the concept of Human
Factors. We write about it; we study it; we agonize over it, but we can't
quite seem to come to grips with it. I submit that while all that has been
done, is being done, and will be done is important and necessary, it is all
for naught because we continually overlook one key element - application.
There exists in the FAA no vehicle whereby the knowledge and experience of
the experts in the fields (truly there is a multiplicity of disciplines
involved) are brought to bear on the requirements definition, acquisition and
implementation process.
This paper proposes a concept which, if implemented as an element of a total
FAA Human Factors program, would insure the delivery of far superior products
to the controller in the field.
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
The concept under discussion here makes several basic assumptions. It would
be impossible for the concept to be understood, much less accepted, without an
acceptance of these assumptions:
-the human is one element in a very complex ATC system of many elements
-a major consideration in controller Human Factors is one of information
flow - from the machine to the controller and from the controller to the
machine
-the controller has two input sources - ears and eyes
-the controller has two output sources - voice and touch
-each I/O source is unique in its capabilities and its limitations
(sight requires direction, touch requires proximity, etc.)
-the human mind processes different data types in different ways_ ergo,
the form in which a datum type is presented is of extreme importance
(properly design allows for pre-processing external to the human.
CURRE_ FALLACY
The time honored approach to human factors within the FAA has been: "Ask the
user what he wants_ he knows best." Often a preliminary step is taken in
which a computer display expert or an engineering expert will offer a choice
of two or three options for the user to select from. These choices are
usually very sound Computer display or en_ineerinE options, but are they
sound human factors options? Another common preliminary step in the name of
human factors is to study the new hardware from an ergonomics perspective.
These studies will lead to either recommendations or a report (or both) but
never to requirements.
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The bottom line is that all elements of the system conform to
requirements developed and approved by experts in the field except for the
most complex system element - the human. And why is this? Simply because
all other elements of the system are under configuration managementexcept
the human. Also, the transfer of data between elements is designed and
controlled by Interface Control Documents (ICDs) but no such vehicle exists
for data transfer to or from the human.
THE SOLUTION
A system must be created along with the enabling support structure which
will configuration manage the human mind. As is the case with any other
configuration managed system element, the supporting structure must have the
capability and authority to influence the design, acquisition and
implementation of any new or modified hardware, software or procedure which
causes a change in the data flow to or from the human. Equally important is
the capability and authority over anything which would change the way in
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GOAL
PROVIDE THE TECHNOLOGY BASE LEADING TO
IMPROVED SAFETY OF THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE
SYSTEM THROUGH DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION
OF HUMAN-CENTERED AUTOMATION TECHNOLOGIES
FOR AIRCRAFT CREWS AND AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS






• Automation can improve the efficiency, capacity and
dependability of the national aviation system
m BUT
• Humans will manage, operate and assure the safety
of the next generation system
THEREFORE m
• Human-centered automation is the key to system
effectiveness
7O
I AVIATION SAFETY/AUTOMATION ]
Specific Objectives
• To develop the basis, consisting of philosophies
and guidelines, for applying human-centered
automation to the flight deck and ATC controller
station
• To provide human-centered automation concepts
and methods to the flight crew which ensure
full situation awareness
• To provide human-centered automation concepts
and methods for ATC controllers which allow
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SUMMARY OF THE INDUSTRY/NASA/FAA
WORKSHOP ON PHILOSOPHY OF
AUTOMATION: PROMISES AND REALITIES
Susan D. Norman




Issues of flight deck automation are mulfi-faceted and complex. The rapid introduction of advanced
computer based technology on to the flight deck of transport category aircraft has had considerable
impact on both aircraft operations and the flight crew. As part of NASA's responsibility to facilitate
an active exchange of ideas and information between members of the aviation community, an
Industry/NASA/FAA workshop was conducted in August 1988. This paper summarized the major
conclusions of that workshop.
One of the most important conclusions to emerge from the workshop was that the introduction of
automation has clearly benefited aviation and has substantially improved the operational safety and
efficiency of our air transport system. For example, one carrier stated that they have been flying the
Boeing 767 (one of the first aircraft to employ substantial automation) since 1982, and they have
never had an accident or incident resulting in damage to the aircraft.
Notwithstanding its benefits, many issues associated with the design, certification, and operation of
automated aircraft were identified. For example two key conceptual issues were the need for the
crew to have a thorough understanding of the system and the importance of defining the pilot's role.
With respect to certification, a fundamental issue is the lack of comprehensive human factors
requirements in the current regulations. Operational considerations, which have been a factor in
incidents involving automation, were also cited.
Copies of the final report, NASA Conference Publication 10036, may be obtained by requesting a
copy from
Susan Norman
Aerospace Human Factors Division
NASA Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California 94035
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AUTOMATION IS A CLEAR BENEFIT
DESIGN PHILOSOPHIES








• Crews need to understand HOW the system works
MODE MISAPPLICATION
• Crew assumption that the a!rcraft is operating in one
mode when it Is actually In another
OPERATIONAL CRUTCHES
• Changing an operationalprocedure to get around an Improper
design
SOFT FAILURES
• When an automated system Is not Indicating a failure
yet something Is clearly wrong
ISSUES IN AUTOMATION
DESIGN/
ROLE el the PILOT
f
• Maintain operational safety • Systems management
• Goat selling Operational udgsment




1) UNDERSTANDINGNORMAL versus IRREGULAR OPERATIONS
Irregular operations are "UNANTICIPATED"
deviations from intended flight operations
2) DEFINE the ROLE of the PILOT
Distinguish between the Pilot's GOAL and ROLE
Develop a Philosophy of Automation
3) AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION INTERFACE
A SYSTEMS Perspective is needed
4) CERTIFICATION of AUTOMATED SYSTEMS
Need to develop HUMAN FACTORS criteria/guidelines
82
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The rapid advance of cockpit automation in the last decade has outstripped the ability of the human
factors profession to understand the changes in human functions required. High technology cockpits
require less physical (observable) workload, but are highly demanding of cognitive functions such as
planning, alternative selection, and monitoring. Furthermore, automation creates opportunity for new and
more serious forms of human error, and many pilots are concerned about the possibility of complacency
affecting their performance.
On the positive side, the equipment works "as advertised" with high reliability, offering highly efficient,
computer-based flight. These findings from the cockpit studies probably apply equally to other industries,
such as nuclear power production, other modes of transportation, medicine, and manufacturing, all of
which traditionally have looked to aviation for technological leadership. The challenge to the human
factors profession is to aid designers, operators, and training departments in exploiting the positive side
of automation, while seeking solutions to the negative side.








Line Operations _ Ouldelln_s

















U.S.S. Vincennes/Iran Air 655
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CRM ISSUES
• Who does what (SOPA)
• Supervision
• Shift of authority
• Independence of crew members
• Failure to coordinate more critical




• High enthusiasm for 757, but reservations
about safety
• Workload may be increased or decreased
• Less time head-up in terminal area
• Two vs. three pilots still at issue
• Training overall good, but too much emphasis on
automation rather than basics
• ATC limits exploitation of 757 features
especially VNAV
• Crew coordination critical in glass cockpit
INTERVENTION STRATEGIES
• BASIC HUMAN ENGINEERING
• CREW COORDINATION TRAINING
• INTELLIGENT WARNING AND ALERTING
• ERROR-EVIDENT DISPLAYS
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NASA Ames Research Center
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AVIATION SAFETY/AUTOMATION PROGRAM CONFERENCE
11-12 October 1989
HUMAN-CENTERED AUTOMATION PHILOSOPHY
ATA National Plan, April 1989; pg. 5:
• The fundamental concern is the lack of a scientifically based philosophy of
automation which describes the circumstances under which tasks are
appropriately allocated to the machine and/or to the pilot.
- Humans will continue to manage and direct the NAS through 2010.
- Automation should be designed to assist and augment the capabilities of
the human managers.
- It is vitally important to develop human-centered automation for the
piloted cockpit and controller work station.
• NASA's Aviation Safety/Automation Program is founded in large part on these precepts.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRECEPTS IN THE NATIONAL PLAN
• An explicit philosophy of automation, and the explicit allocation of functions between
humans and machines in the system, are inextricable.
- Both must be approached as fundamental design Issues.
• By implication, automation can be designed to fulfill any task necessary for effective
system functioning.
- This is not true yet, but we believe it will be within a decade or so, perhaps
sooner.
• Despite this automation capability, humans are to continue to manage and control
the system, for a variety of social and political as well as technical (and probably
economic) reasons.
- Automation should therefore function to supplement, not to supplant, the
human management and control function in civil air transport.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
93
HUMAN-CENTERED AUTOMATION PHILOSOPHY

















simplified flight control with
comprehensive envelope
protection (A-320)
• Do these systems, as implemented to date, supplement, or tend to
supplant, the flight crew as manager and controller of its aircraft?
• Do they perform the functions that a human-centered automation
philosophy would allocate to the machine, or to the human ?
ZT:_ - c
• To answer these questions, we must be more explicit. What do we mean
by "human-centered automation"? Is it merely a catchy phrase, or a
concept that can be defined and evaluated rigorously?
• Because of the central importance of this question, we have given it
considerable attention from tl_e gerlesis- of the Aviation Safety/Automation
concept and program in 1987, though our work leading up to this program
has been in progress for nearly a decade.
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• The answer depends on the automation philosophy embodied in the aircraft:
- Why is the flight crew informed?
- What are they expected to do about the information?
- Are they informed before, or after, action has been taken?
- Are they expected to diagnose the problem, choose a course of action,
concur with such a choice, carry out the action, or simply to be aware of
altered aircraft configuration or status?
• These and other similar questions about increasingly
competent and autonomous automated systems have led to a
search for a set of irreducible first principles for human-
centered aircraft automation.
• Our present construct is shown in the following viewgraph, in the
hope that we shall receive constructive criticism from the experts
at this workshop.
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The pilot bears the ultimate responsibility for the safety of
any _ght operation.
The human operator must be in command.
The human operator must be _. To be involved,
the human operator must be "nt.Q_ffrmed.
Because systems are fallible, and in order to remain informed,
The human operator must monitor the system.
Because humans are likewise fallible,
The system should also monitor the human operator.
If monitoring is to be effective,
Each component must have knowledge of the other's
intent.
HUMAN-CENTERED AUTOMATION: APPLICATIONS OF
CONSTRUCT
We have examined a number of mishaps and proposed systems in terms of this
construcl:
• China Airlines descent into SFO
- Needed A/P status information not immediately obvious
- Flight crew not sufficiently involved
- Was system effectively in command?
• Air Canada fuel exhaustion
- FMC system knew flight crew intent
- But aircraft was unable to inform crew of insufficient fuel
• A proposed system with automatic reconfiguration
- Should operator be informed of problem, or solution?
- Should operator be involved in decision to reconfigure?
96
HUMAN-CENTEREDAUTOMATION PHILOSOPHY
We have used this construct to evaluate a limited number of automated systems
in current aircraft.
• It points out certain known shortcomings in these systems, especially
with respect to information management
• It also suggests ways in which information transfer belween humans and
systems might be improved
We are using this construct in the design of automated checklists for a series of
experiments which will begin this fall
• To determine whether the construct is viable
• To determine how it must be modified or extended to serve as the basis
for human-centered automation guidelines in our studies:
- automated procedures monitoring
- smart checklists
- automated diagnostics systems
SUMMARY
• Objectives of this Element of the Program
- Development of concepts and guidelines
- Evaluation of competing philosophies
- Integration of program elements in an intelligent, human-centered
automated cockpit
- Functional validation of these concepts and systems
• Cooperative research with industry in pursuit of these goals
• Hopefully, incorporation of validated concepts into automated interactive
cockpit design tools.
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WHY DOES THE 747-400 HAVE NASA-DEVELOPED
WINGLETS_ BUT NO NASA-DEVELOPED
TAKE-OFF MONITOR?
/ ..- •
...*' ..- , , ,
_j- _.1 _ ,
ORy WHY IS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER HARDER IN FLIGHT DECK













What is the most effective means for accomplishing
the transfer of the program's research products?
NASA
ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
SUCCESSFUL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM


































• Transport Aircraft Manufacturers





• FAA (Standards, Regulations)








• Technology (Systems, Designs, Hardware)
Methods - Measures
Guidelines (Training, Operational Design)









• Clear Goal Statement (Shared Goals)
• Economic Incentives
• Measurement Technology































Networking Technologies - Support Structure
Temporary Personnel Exchanges
Cooperative Teams
Consortium Contracts (Novel Contracting)
Portability/Compatibility
• Methods and Scenarios
• l lardwarc and Software
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Many methods of measuring and predicting operator workload have been developed that provide useful
information in the design, evaluation, and operation of complex systems and which aid in developing
models of human attention and performance. However, the relationships between such measures,
imposed task demands, and measures of performance remain complex and even contradictory. It
appears that we have ignored an important factor: people do not passively translate task demands into
performance. Rather, they actively manage their time, resources, and effort to achieve an acceptable
level of performance while maintaining a comfortable level of workload. While such adaptive, creative,
and strategic behaviors are the primary reason that human operators remain an essential component of
all advanced man-machine systems, they also result in individual differences in the way people respond
to the same task demands and inconsistent relationships among measures. Finally, we are able to
measure workload and performance, but interpreting such measures remains difficult; it is still not clear
how much workload is "too much" or "too little" nor the consequences of suboptimal workload on
system performance and the mental, physical, and emotional well-being of the human operators. The
rationale and philosophy of a program of research developed to address these issues will be reviewed
and contrasted to traditional methods of defining, measuring, and predicting human operator workload.
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH GOALS






o MEASURES ARE RELATIVE
o HIGH VARIABILITY
o NO "REDLINES"
o TOO MANY MEASURES
o NO FIGURES OF _MERIT
o NO STANDARDIZATION




EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPUTER-GAME TRAINER IN








FLIGHT7: LEAVING PRACTICE AREA











4 5 6 7 8
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EFFECTIVENESS OF AUTOMATION IN RELEASING
RESOURCES TO PERFORM OTHER TASKS




















ELEMENT 4: METHODS OF IMPROVING STRATEGIES
MILESTONES:
IDENTIFY OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
FOR TYPICAL FLIGHT TASKS AND
SITUATIONS
DEVELOP TRAINING PROCEDURES
TO IMPROVE PILOTS' MANAGEMENT
OF TIME/RESOURCES, STRATEGY
SHIFTS APPROPRIATE FOR STATE
DEVELOP CONCEPTUAL DESIGNS
FOR COMPUTER AIDS TO IMPROVE
PILOTS ABILITIES TO SELECT
APPROPRIATE PLANS, STRATEGIES
AND TACTICS
TEST CONCEPTUAL DESIGNS FOR
INFLIGHT ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS FOR
DYNAMIC TASK ALLOCATION
FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SUBJECTIVE WORKLOAD
"REDLINES"





























AVERAGED DATA FROM I1 SUBJECTS SHOWS
CORRELATION OF 3,PIIYSIOLOGICAL MEASURES
tt EA RT- RATE IIEART-R ATE HEART-RATE
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AVERAGED DATA FROM II SUBJECTS SHOWS
DECREMENT IN "UNDERLOAD" TASK PERFORMANCE
MEAN REACTION TIME VS. BLOCK NUMBER
EFFECT OF BOREDOM ON PERFORMANCE, WORKLOAD
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SYMPTOMS OF UNDER/OVERLOAD STATES
WORKLOAD
SUBJECTIVE PHYSIOLOGICAL









OVER- SIGNIFICANT NONE UNACCEP-
WHELMED CHANGE TABLE
COMPEN-
STRESSED SOME SATION: ACCEPTABLE
CHANGE - SHED
° DEFER




















LOGICAL CORRELATES OF SUB-
JECTIVE OVER/UNDERLOAD STATES
INVESTIGATE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES IN PERSONAL
WORKLOAD CRITERIA
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SCHEDULING THEORY MODELS OF WORKLOAD
INFLUENCE OF STRATEGY ON RATED WORKLOAD
]]ME AVAILABLE:
[Z 20% MORE THAN NEEDED
I D JUST ENOUGH

























EFFECTIVE ¥1ME T m
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SHAPA: VERBAL/NONVERBAL PROTOCOL ANALYSIS TOOL
SHAPA
ENCODING SUPPORT REPORT GENERATION
- FILE MANIPULATION















- RUNS ON IBM-AT WITH EGA
- FULLY INTERACTIVE
- ENCODER DETERMINES ENCODING MODEL/THEORY
- FASTER ENCODING
- CHOICE OF DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
- DIRECT ENGAGEMENT WITH DATA
UN D.E R DEYELO.IPMENT_: Mag._HA P.A
- MULTIPLE INTERACTING AGENTS



















NAVIGATION ! NAvMONITORGATIONI LANDINGPLANNING PROGRESS _1
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D_ERM,NE ] ', D_ERMINELOCATION i HEADING
















WORKLOAD/PERFORMANCE FOR COMPONENT TASKS
WINDOWS DISPLAY
1. 2.
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SPATIAL VERBAL SPEED ALTITUDE HEADING
DiSCRE'JrF.,_CONTINUOUSTASK COMPONENTS
RESPONSE LATENCY FOR DISCRETE TASKS
,i11,*
_A'n_ _EAI.
REAL-TIME MEASUREMENT OF MENTAL WORKLOAD









I m P3 CROSS CORRELATION
I _ SLOW-WAVE AREA
SAME,Es,',E_,ALS)





GAUGE MONITORING TASK: RESPONSE TIME
!
S-T EA_rn'_,IA'rM _ naAI'I,a
CONCURRENTTAa_
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DISPLAYBEFORE CHANGE DISPLAY AFTER CHANGE
®®®®®@ @®©
RESPONSE TO CHANGE IN:
MONITORED READOUT







































INFLUENCE OF DISPLAY DESIGN ON PILOT'S HEART RATE
STEREO vs NON-STEREO LNDG/APPR DISPLAY













[] NON-STEREO• STEREO DISPLAY
I
1 2 3 4 5 6
PILOT NUMBER
COMPARISON AMONG MEASURES
NAVIGATION TASK: TRACKING PERFORMANCE








INFERENCES ABOUT "EFFORT" AND WORKLOAD CANNOT BE
















TIME - - >
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HYPOTHETICAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TASK DEMANDS, EFFORT,






































HYPOTHETICAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF STRATEGIES
CHARACTERISTICS OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIORS
A DEVELOPMENT/SETFING
/ _ OF HIGH LEVEL GOALS
PLANS _ik OPEN'LOOP)
/ \ DYNAMICSELECTION
/ ......... _ AMONG ALTERNATIVE
/ _ I HA I I:_11:_ _ SEQUENCES OF ACTIONS
/ _TO ACHIEVE A GOAL
/ _ CLOSED-LOOP, RELATIVELY
/' T^PTIP_ _ AUTOMATIC, PERFORMANCE
/ ....... _ OF ACTIONS APPROPRIATE
/ _ FOR SELECTED STRATEGY
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ADOPT STANDARD METHOD OF
rDENTtFYING STRATEGIES
QUANTIFY PERFORMANCE/WORK-
LOAD CORRELATES OF SPECIFIC
STRATEGIES/STRATEGY SHIFTS
INVESTIGATE ROLE OF PILOT STATE
AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES ON
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
CLASSIFY STRATEGIES TYPICAL OF
VARIOUS TASKS, ENVIRONMENTS
DETERMINE WHY PILOTS ADOPT OR












FIGURES OF MERIT- II
GOAL:
IDENTIFY A PARSIMONIOUS SET OF VARIABLES WHICH, IN COMBINATION, ARE
DESCRIPTIVE OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE PILOT/VEHICLE INTERFACE DESIGN
AND PILOT'S INTENT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
APPROACH:
• SELECT 50 VARIABLES FROM THOSE ALREADY AVAILABLE
• MONITOR PERFORMANCE OF NOVICE AND EXPERT PILOTS IN AF'rl F-16 DURING:
-- AIR-TO-AIR MISSION
- TERRAIN-FOLOWING MISSION
• MEASURE PILOT WORKLOAD USING SWAT
• SELECT PARSIMONIOUS SET OF VARIABLES USING MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SCALING,
CLUSTER ANALYSIS, ETC
- IDENTIFY REDUNDANT MEASURES
- IDENTIFY MEASURES THAT PROVIDE UNIQUE INFORMATION
- COMBINE SOME MEASURES TO CHARACTERIZE A PARTICULAR
ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE
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FIGURES OF MERIT- I
GOAL:
DEVELOP COMPOSITE FIGURE OF MERIT FOR
PERFORMANCE
APPROACH:
• EXPERIMENTAL TASK (SCORE):
-- 10-MIN TRIALS
-- 2nd-ORDER, 1-AXIS PURSUIT TRACKING
-- MONITOR 8 DIALS
-- ONLINE SUBTASK PERFORMANCE
FEEDBACK
• FIGURE OF MERIT
-- EQUALLY WEIGHTED AVERAGE OF:
o TRACKING (% MAX ERROR; 1-10)
o MONITORING (% MAX ERROR; 1-10)
-- SELF EVALUATION (ONCE PER MIN)
RESULTS:
• Ss FOCUSED ON TRACKING (BASED ON
PERFORMANCE STRATEGY, SELF RATING)
• EQUAL WEIGHTING INAPPROPRIATE




_ _ _ MEASURES;
: " ] TIMELINESS
! I CORRECTNESS







TRADITIONAL MEASURES LOSE THEIR MEANING IF OPERATORS DO NOT











TRADITIONAL MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
DISCRETE TASKS:
TASK








_ _ . ._ _ - PHASE LAG
MEAN RMS ERROR
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ELEMENT 1: FIGURES OF MERIT (FoM)
MILESTONES:











USE IN LAB, SIMULATOR, FLIGHT
RESEARCH
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FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93
DEVELOP PERFORMANCE FIGURES
)F MERIT
;)UANTIFY EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC
BEHAVIOR, PILOT STATE
" IDENTIFY EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR
PWORKLOAD MEASURES
IMPROVE PILOTS' ABILITIES TO
_ANAGE WORKLOAD EXTREMES
_U CT_
1. PREDICTIVE TOOLS FOR SYSTEM DESIGNERS
L t/_,,
2. STANDARD EVALUATION PROCEDURES FOR AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION
3. IMPROVED THEORETICAL MODEL OF WORKLOAD
4. WORKLOAD-MANAGEMENT TRAINING CONCEPTS






PROPOSED DYNAMIC CONCEPT OF WORKLOAD





OPERATOR EXPERIENCE |. \
EXPECTEO_ACCEPTA_LEI _\
WORKLOAO I
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_o EXTERNAL SCENE ._
CURRENT CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF WORKLOAD GENERALLY IGNORE











ASSESSING INFORMATION TRANSFER IN
FULL MISSION FLIGHT SIMULATIONS
Alfred T. Lee
NASA Ames Research Center




Considerable attention must be given to the important topic of aircrew situation awareness in any dis-
cussion of aviation safety and flight deck design. Reliable means of assessing this important aspect of
crew behavior Without simultaneously interfering with that behavior are difficult to develop. Unobtru-
sive measurement of crew situation awareness is particularly important in the conduct of full mission
simulations where considerable effort and cost is expended to achieve a high degree of operational
fidelity. An unobtrusive method of assessing situational awareness is described in this paper which
employs a topical analysis of intra-crew communications. The communications were taken from
videotapes of crew behavior prior to, during, and following an encounter with a microburst/windshear
event. The simulation scenario re-created an actual encounter with an event during an approach into
Denver Stapleton Airport. The analyses were conducted on twelve experienced airline crews with
the objective of determining the effect on situation awareness of uplinking ground-based information
of the crew during the approach. The topical analysis of crew communication was conducted on all
references to weather or weather-related topics. The general weather topic was further divided into
weather subtopical references such as surface winds, windshear, precipitation, etc., thereby allowing
for an assessment of the relative frequency of subtopic reference during the scenario. Reliable differ-
ences were found between the relative frequency of subtopical references when comparing the com-
munications of crews receiving a cockpit display of ground-based information to the communications
of a control group. The findings support the utility of this method of assessing situation awareness
and information value in full mission simulations. A limiting factor in the use of this measure is that
crews vary in the amount of intra-crew communications that may take place due to individual differ-
ences and other factors associated with crew coordination. This factor must be taken into considera-
tion when employing this measure.


























ATIS information for Denver ApProach
STAPLETON AIRPORT INFORMATION YANKEE. Two
two zero zero Zulu. Temperature 74, dewp0int 44, wind
calm. Altimeter two niner niner six. Expect visual
approach runway two six left, two six right, and two five.
Caution for C0nstruct_on SOUtheast corner of Bravo
concourse. Microburst and low level windshear
advisories are in effect. Convective SIGMET three six
Charlie is in effect for Nebraska and Eastern Colorado
for an area of severe thunderstorms. Contact Denver
Flight Service for further details. VFR aircraft south and
southeast, contact Denver Approach on 119.3, other
VFR aircraft 126.9. All aircraft advise on initial contact
you have Information Yankee.





GROUP COCKPIT COMMUNICATION EVENTS WITH
AND WITHOUT GROUND-BASED WEATHER DISPLAY











I GOAL I To conduct principled human-systems interaction
.......................................research:
Develop Significant Design Principles
Develop Timely Design Alternatives
Develop Appropriate Design Tools
• Develop Meaningful Evaluation
Instruments
I JUSTIFICATION: ! Performance-Aiding Systems are proliferating
without a fundamental understanding of how they
should interact with the humans who must control
them.
HUMAN-CENTERED AUTOMATION
INVOLVES INTERACTION IN ALL
THREE DOMAINS
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I THE EVOLUTIONARY RESEARCHllPROCESS (adaptedfromw.Rouse,1989)
• What you know you can do
• What you are willing to promise you can do
• What you would like to do
tTwo Views of Automation Research I
f HARDWARE VIEW:
• Focus on Hardware Capability
• Focus on Hardware Performance
• Focus on Hardware Testing
• Focus on Sensing Criteria &
Logic
_ HUMAN-CENTERED VIEW:
I iFocus on the User
I i Focus on User Performance
I " FOcus on Human Performance
I ._eStiu_in Matching Information
_,,.to user need and current context/
PERFORMANCE-AIDING SYSTEMS (just as any technological
systems) WILL SUCCEED IN THEIR PURPOSE TO THE EXTENT
THAT THEY EFFECTIVELY DELIVER THEIR CAPABILITIES TO
THEIR USERS !!!
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Event-Driven Task and Performance I!_
• DOMAIN MODEL Constraints
Scenario Specification
User goal/intent structure li
• BEHAVIORAL MODEL User Understanding I
Performance Predictions {_
............................................................... -!
• PERFORMANCE TRACE Measurement Technology I II
Testing Environment I._i
Analysis Technology ii_





Full Task Simulation I
Simulation _.._ign/Testing {
Environment .......{.............itera_tive_ 1
Basic { l Comparative {





Dimensions I Complexity - Simplicityntrol- Realis
"Principled" - Trial & Error
Applied - Basic (theoretical)




• Personal Computer Work Stations
• Local Area Network (LAN) connection
• Interactive Digital Video
• Sophisticated Hyper-Type Software
• Integrated Input/Output devices :
keyboards, mice, track-balls,joy sticks, microphones,
touch-screens, speakers, printers, telephones,
video tape recorders/players, cameras,
scanners, sound digitizers etc.
NEW TECHNOLOGIES FORI
PERSISTENT PROBLEMS I
• Access to Expert subjects
• (potential users)
Limited time frame
• Cost & scheduling of Full Simulation
• Data translation / lack of compre-





















i--Rapid Dynamic Prototyping J_
- Easy to Use Object Behavior Specification
- Reusable & Copyable Code
- Quick to Adjust/Change Feature Specification




- Automatic collection of data
- On-line Evaluation
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ISample Research Infrastructurel '_(continued) I
I. Integrated Data Collection
I
- Time-Stamped Event Protocol Files
- Screen - Configuration
- Summary Files (Action Breakdown)
i" Integrated Data Analysis !
- Statistical Software Packages
I " Design Documentation and Training Module J.
- Concept Communication
- Criterion Practice and Testing
Popular Statements based on
Misconceptions about Human Factors
and Interface Design
"The system will use a mouse and icons and will have
multiple windows - therefore it will be easy to use."
"The new interface, using color coding, command echoing,
text editing, and a variety of input modes, has resulted






USING THIS TECHNOLOGY CAUSES
OPERATIONAL ERRORS, PANIC,
INCREASED WORKLOAD, AND MAY
COMPLICATE YOUR JOB"
lNEED:FOR. .IvlET
• What constitutes safe and efficient performance ?
• How can and should we measure the impact of new devices ?
• How can we translate system capacity improvement goals into
standards for acceptable human performance ?
Example metric for Performance Analysis with new Interfaces
(after Whiteside, Wixon, and Jones, 1988):
1 1 [ A rate measure that expresses percentage l
S = _ PC of the task completed per unit of time -
the higher the score, the better, the more
T .... efficient the performance
S= Performance Score
T= Time spend in task
P= Percentage of task completed
C-- A constant (example 5 minutes)
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New problems are found in the
"new and improved" systems
which renders them ineffective
[TYP/CA L Predictable Pr°b!ems:
• Lack of feedback .... what is the system doing ?
• Unanticipated Interdependencies .... why is it not accepting this ?
• Lack of "impedance matching"....why does it take 3 steps when I
think of it as just one step ?
• Lack of consistency of input forms (and labelling) .... which do I use
"cancel" or "delete"?




;nter the three letter identifier:
ATIS REQUEST
Enter the three letter identifier:
ATIS REQUEST
Enter the three letter identifier
ORD ORD ORD
[_ I SENDI I SENDI
A CONFIRMATION MESSAGE IS NEEDED ESPECIALLY WHEN SENDING
INFORMATION FROM ONE STATION TO THE NEXT !
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A,
I Examples for Data-Link ITechnology (continued)l_
"THE LABELLING PROBLEM"
I CLEAR II CANCEL II DELETE I
? _1-_ the current display, message, paragraph, line, word ?
? _:_ the current selection, this message, the last request ?
? d_l=._i_ WHAT FROM WHERE ?
a.
I ALT FL330 I
OK
I HDG160 1 I HDG160 1
??? "..turn LEFT/RIGHT ..."
A HUMAN-CENTERED APPROACH MEANS CRAFTSMANSHIP
AND ATTENTION TO DETAILS !
• stress clear system and performance goals
• involve users at all phases of design
• conduct empirical tests
DESIGNERS MUST BE PREPARED TO REEVALUATE THEIR
ASSUMPTIONS>>>WE NEED A FLEXIBLE AND HOLISTIC APPROACH




ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY, COST, AND
UTILITY OF DEVELOPING MODELS OF






Substantial change is expected in aviation in the United States, both commercial and private, over
the next decade and beyond. New aviation tools ( TCAS, innovative CDTI display concepts, and
"cockpit weather management") are now being developed that will change the essential nature of
aviation. There is also the expectation that the system itself will change; load will increase; more
"high flight" will occur, and more capable and efficient aircraft will become available, along with
many other fundamental changes. Changes will also occur in areas separate from, but that will
impact on aviation. For example, new methods will be developed for selection and training of pilot
and ground personnel, and flight procedures will continue to evolve.
Decisions regarding the development of new technologies, such as those mentioned above, or
related implementation issues (training requirements of new technologies) are usually difficult to
make prior to the testing and/or fielding phase of a system development effort. A primary reason
for the difficulty is the unavailability of data useful for evaluating the system's effectiveness. In
some situations, models of various types ( simulation, statistical, or mathematical) provide data that
can be used for such evaluation.
The purpose of the effort outlined in this briefing will be to determine whether models exist or can
be developed that can be used to address aviation automation issues. A multidisciplinary team has
been assembled to undertake this effort, including experts in human performance, team/crew, and
aviation system modeling, and aviation data used as input to such models. The project consists of
two phases, a requirements assessment phase that is designed to determine the feasibility and utility
of alternative modeling efforts, and a model development and evaluation phase that will seek to
implement the plan (if a feasible cost effective development effort is found) that results from the
first phase.
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HUMAN PERFORMANCE MODELS TO ASSESS
AUTOMATION IMPACTS IN AVIATION
GOAL:
• Determine impacts of automation oll Aviation performance
OBJECTIVES:
• Assess feasibility of modeling key aspects of the
Aviation System
• Determine value and cost of adding human performance to
existing aviation system models
• Develop a research plan











Model Development and Evaluation
Phase I
Determine Needs/Requirements
Inventory and Evaluate Existing Models
Detail Additional Modeling Requirements












































Models of Individual Performance
o
THERP (Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction)
OAT (Operator Action Tree)
HCR (Human Cognitive Reliability)
SLIM-MAUD (Success Likelihood Index Methodology--MultiAttribute Utility
Decomposition)
STAHR (Socio-Technical Assessment of Human Reliability)
CES (Cognitive Environmental Simulation)
HOS (Human Operator Simulation)
Norman's Model of Action Slips
Reason's Model of Action Lapses
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To provide increased aid and support to the
flight crew of civil transport aircraft through the
use of artificial intelligence techniques




Develop And Evaluate Cockpit Systems That Provide
-Flight Crews With Safe And Effective Ways And Means
To Manage Aircraft Systems, Plan And Replan Flights,
And Respond To Contingencies





























- Develops behavioral expectations
- Collects relevant data
- Makes appropriate comparisons
-Interprets data into information
Provides subsystem information which
either directly or indirectly leads to
an appropriate response.
• "Acts like a flight engineer"
Information Requirements
• Caution and warning exceedances
• Degradations (abnomal but within range)
• Data interpretation
• Dynamic information (derivatives)
• Relative parameter information
• Low level of false alarms


































Sensor noise level is 0.05.
Simulation does not account for engine spool-up.





O Monitors turbofan engine
O Separate device data base
I Sensor-centered object
oriented design




O Early detection of abnormalities
0 Minimal interpretation of data
0 Quality system state description
0 Low number of false alarms
0 Relatively low implementation expense
REMAINING WORK
Determine false alarm rate
- on Symbolics using aircraft data
- on a PC =n an LaRC test aircraft
Implement for other subsystems
(e.g. electrical, hydraulic)
Implement on other test aircraft
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REMAINING ISSUES
• Prioritize monitoring tasks
• Develop guidelines for knowledge
acquisition of rules and noise levels
• Evaluate effects of faulty inputs
to the model

















Situation: Incorrect sensor (EPR). Similar to the 1982 Air










NASA Langley Research Center




The objective of the research in this area of fault management is to develop and implement a decision
aiding concept for diagnosing faults, especially faults which are difficult for pilots to identify, and
to develop methods for presenting the diagnosis information to the flight crew in a timely and
comprehensible manner.
The requirements for the diagnosis concept were identified by interviewing pilots, analyzing actual
incident and accident cases, and examining psychology literature on how humans perform diagnosis.
The diagnosis decision aiding concept developed based on those requirements takes abnormal sensor
readings as input, as identified by a fault monitor. Based on these abnormal sensor readings, the diagnosis
concept identifies the cause or source of the fault and all components affected by the fault. This concept
was implemented for diagnosis of aircraft propulsion and hydraulic subsystems in a computer program
called Draphys (Diagnostic Reasoning About Physical Systems).
Draphys is unique in two important ways. First, it uses models of both functional and physical
relationships in the subsystems. Using both models enables the diagnostic reasoning to identify the
fault propagation as the faulted system continues to operate, and to diagnose physical damage. Draphys
also reasons about behavior of the faulted system over time, to eliminate possibilities as more information
becomes available, and to update the system status as more components are affected by the fault.
The crew interface research is examining display issues associated with presenting diagnosis information
to the flight crew. One study examined issues for presenting system status information. One lesson
learned from that study was that pilots found fault situations to be more complex if they involved
multiple subsystems. Another was pilots could identify the faulted systems more quickly if the system
status was presented in pictorial or text format. Another study is currently under way to examine pilot
mental models of the aircraft subsystems and their use in diagnosis tasks.
Future research plans include piloted simulation evaluation of the diagnosis decision aiding concepts
and crew interface issues.
OUTLINE



























INFORMATION CONTAINED IN A
FAULT HYPOTHESIS






• Uses Models Of Both Functional And
Physical Relationships
- Identify Fault Propagation
- Diagnose Physical Damage
• Reasons About Behavior Over Time
- Eliminate Possibilities




• Propulsion and Hydraulic Subsystems
• Workstation Implementation





• Electrical and Pneumatic Subsystems
• Real Time Implementation
INITIAL CREW INTERFACE RESEARCH STUDY
Objective:
Provide display format guidelines for presenting system
status information to improve situational awareness
Technical Issues Addressed:
• Display style (pictorial vs symbolic vs text)
• Hypothesis presentation style (composite vs multiple)
• Information density (all relevant vs out-of-tolerance
only)
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, ii ill iq iiI .................................
SYSTEM STATUS FORMATS
RESULTS
• Response time increased with display complexity
Response time decreased with"
- Pictorial and text display styles
- Composite hypothesis presentation style
- Out-of-tolerance only
I





PILOT DIAGNOSTIC REASONING STUDY
Objective:
Determine pilot mental models of aircraft subsystems
and their use in diagnostic problem solving tasks
Technical Issues Addressed:
• Can Diagnosis Behavior Be Predicted Based
On Knowledge Of Mental Models?
Do Pilots Misdiagnose Because They Lack
Knowledge Or Because They Apply Knowledge
Improperly?
PILOT DIAGNOSTIC REASONING STUDY
Two Experiments
One Generic, One Application Specific




Diagnosis Behavior Can Be
On That Person's Mental
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CREW INTERFACES FOR DIAGNOSIS
Future Directions
Displaying Multiple Faults
Displaying Fault Propagation Behavior














System Goal: To provide intelligent aiding for monitoring, diagnosis
and response to aircraft system failures.
FAULT FINDER
Recovery









DATA FLOW CONTEXT FOR RECORS
Altitude | Simulation _ EPR Too High_u____q___stII / ;:'_:L I NI Higher Than N2 I I1/" .... I •
|Physical a.nd _] Engine Failed
IIFunctional / [ /
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GOALS OF RECOVERY RECOMMENDATION
SYSTEM (RECORS) ARE SITUATION ASSESSMENT
AND RESPONSE AIDING DURING EMERGENCIES
Method:
• Predict effects of faults on future system behavior
• Perform reasoning to aid the time-stressed and/or capacity limited
flight-crew to suggest response to faults





• Functions in a help mode, rather than autonomous mode
- pilot is in the Loop
- pilot has Final Authority
- explanation of Reasoning and Displays are Important
• Uses a causal model of the aircraft and the flight domain
• Reasons at multiple levels of abstraction
• Predicts the effects of aircraft system failures on flight profile




• Help identify faults based on their effects on the system
• Help make up for lack of sensor data by inferencing
• Predict long-term effects of actions to help in response selection
RECORS: CAUSAL MODEL
• Model implemented within Object-Oriented,
Frame-Based representation formalism
• Model consists of objects representing:
- aircraft sub-systems
- effectors




° Represents both the taxonomic and the causal
relationships among the objects
RECORS:
MULTIPLE LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION
• Two orthogonal types of abstraction exist in the model: taxonomic
and causal
- Taxonomic ("iS-A" relationship)
Taxonomic abstraction consist of the different levels of the model
hierarchy
Causal: causal relationships among model objects expressed
at binary and qualitative levels (AFFECTS and AFFECTED-BY
relationships)
Causal relationships are represented at both binary and
qualitative levels at each level in the object taxonomy











knowledgeof amountof time specificity
domain data required of results
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
• causal Model Editor
• Subsystem Modeling
- Requires the Representation of various types of Causal Relations
- Different Temporal Propagation Delays Exist Along the Causal Links
- Requires Use of Different Causal Contexts
- Specialized "Device" Models
• Representational Formalism Modified to Reflect these Requirements
• Simulation Algorithm Modified to Reflect These Requirements





- Display Format for Recommendations and Aircraft Effects
- Visual and Textual Explanation of RECORS' Reasoning
• Verification and Validation





- Verify Model Function
- Validate Against Known Accident Responses
• Evaluation
- Test Pilot Acceptance in Cockpit Simulation
RECORS INFERENCING CYCLE























• Version I: Implemented in the KEE development environment
on a Symbolics 3600
• Version I1: Implemented in Zeta LISP Using an Object-Oriented,
Frame-Based Language on a Symbolics XL400
THE INTERFACE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANAGES
THE FLOW OF INFORMATION AND THE DIALOGS
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A FUNCTION-BASED APPROACH TO
COCKPIT PROCEDURE AIDS








The objective of this research is to develop and test a cockpit procedural aid that can compose and
present procedures that are appropriate for the given flight situation; described by the current phase
of flight, the status of the aircraft engineering systems, and the environmental conditions. Prescribed
procedures already exist for normal as well as for a number of non-normal and emergency situations,
and can be presented to the crew using an interactive cockpit display. However, no procedures are
prescribed or recommended for a host of plausible flight situations involving multiple malfunctions
compounded by adverse environmental conditions. Under these circumstances, the cockpit procedural
aid must review the prescribed procedures for the individual malfunction (when available), evaluate the
alternatives or options, and present one or more composite procedures (prioritized or unprioritized) in
response to the given situation.
A top-down function-based conceptual approach towards composing and presenting cockpit proce-
dures is being investigated. This approach is based upon the thought process that an operating crew must
go through while attempting to meet the flight objectives given the current flight situation. In order to
accomplish the flight objectives, certain critical functions must be maintained during each phase of the
flight, using the appropriate procedures or success paths. The viability of these procedures depends upon
the availability of required resources. If resources available are not sufficient to meet the requirements,
alternative procedures (success paths) using the available resources must be constructed to maintain the
critical functions and the corresponding objectives. If no success path exists that can satisfy the critical
functions/objectives, then the next level of critical functions/objectives must be selected and the process
repeated.
Thus, at any given time during a flight, a function-based cockpit procedure performs the following
operations:
* Situation Assessment
- Phase of flight
- Aircraft engineering systems status (malfunction)
- Environmental conditions
* Procedure Selection
- Present prescribed procedures (when available)
- Perform critical functions/success path analysis
- Present alternative procedures/consequences
This function-based approach to cockpit procedural aids is demonstrated through application to flight
scenarios where multiple malfunctions occur during the course of the flight.
PRECED]j\;_ P_QE _LA?,jK NOT F.IL_ED
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Problem Description
OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF A FLIGHT:
• MOVE PASSENGERS FROM ORIGIN TO DESTINATION











• COCKPIT PROCEDURAL AID CAN ASSIST THE CREW




TO DEVELOP A COCKPIT PROCEDURAL AID (CPA) TO




• DEVELOP/PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
MULTIPLE MALFUNCTIONS _ .....
- PRESENT PRESCRIBED PROCEDURES
CORRESPONDING TO EACH MALFUNCTION "
AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
....... _ _-_-_i_ :,.=i_-E_ _IE_=_O M Po_rr_RO_DURES BYAGGREGATiN_: -;!=-_:_-_--_
T_-iE iNDIViDUAL PRESCRIBED:PROCEDURES .......
-- WHERE NO PRESCRIBED PROCEDURES ARE
AVAILABLE, RECOMMEND ALTERNATIVES AND
PRESENT CONSEQUENCES




• EVERY FLIGHT CAN BE HIERARCHICALLY DECOMPOSED
INTO A NUMBER OF PHASES, SEGMENTS, AND
SUB-SEGMENTS
• OVERALL FLIGHT AND ITS INDIVIDUAL PHASES,




• OBJECTIVE IS TO FOLLOW A PRESCRIBED FLIGHT
PROFILE
• A CRITICAL FUNCTION IS A FUNCTION THAT MUST BE
MAINTAINED TO FOLLOW A FLIGHT PROFILE
• CRITICAL FUNCTION ACCOMPLISHED BY ONE OF
SEVERAL SUCCESS PATHS
• A SUCCESS PATH IS A SET OF RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
(PROCEDURES) FOR MAINTAINING THE CRITICAL FUNCTION
• EACH SUCCESS PATH (PROCEDURES) HAS A DEFINITE
SET OF RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
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MONITORS THE GLOBAL FLIGHT OBJECTIVES
PERFORMS THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS:




• MONITOR VEHICLE CONTROL AND STABILITY
• INTERFACE WITH FLIGHT MANAGEMENT
COMPUTATIONS
-- TIME ELAPSED / TIME TO DESTINATION
-- DISTANCE FROM DESTINATION
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-- OBJECTIVES: FLY TO DESTINATION USING A SAFE
AND FUEL EFFICIENT FLIGHT PROFILE
- CRITICAL FUNCTIONS:
• VEHICLE STABILITY / CONTROLLABILITY
• FUEL REMAINING
-- SUCCESS PATHS:
• FUEL MANAGEMENT METHODS
• ALTERNATE VEHICLE CONFIGURATIONS
w RESOURCES REQUIRED:
• FUEL SYSTEM
• AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING SYSTEMS
• ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
• LANDING PHASE
-- OBJECTIVES: LAND WITH PRESCRIBED SPEED
- CRITICAL FUNCTIONS: THRUST AND LIFT
-- SUCCESS PATH: HIGH LIFT DEVICES, CONTROL
SURFACES, THROTTLE, WEIGHT (FUEL)
-- RESOURCES REQUIRED: AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING
SYSTEM, ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
Candidate Scenario #1
FLIGHT: SACRAMENTO TO LOS ANGELES
FLIGHT PLAN:
SMF.FOGGO5 FRA.J7.DERBB.FIM4 LAX FL 330
MALFUNCTIONS:
• DURING CRUISE GEN #1 TRIPS
• AT TOD ENG #30P DEC. TO 36 PSI, OT INC
QUICK SITUATION ASSESSMENT BY CREW AND CPA
• GEN-1 CIRCUIT LIGHT ON
• PRESCRIBED IRREGULAR PROCEDURE
-- CHECK BUS TIE CIRCUIT OPEN LIGHTS (NO)
-- FIELD LIGHTS ON (N0i
-- VOLT AND FREQ NORMAL (YES)
-- CHECK GEN CIRCUIT OPEN LIGHTS OFF (NO)
-- PRESCRIBED ACTION ITEMS:FOLLOW 2-GEN OPEN
IRR PROC TO DROP ELEC LOAD BELOW 54 KW
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Candidate Scenario #1 (cont)
• ENG-3 LOW OIL PRESS LIGHT ON
• PRESCRIBED IRREGULAR PROCEDURE
n OIL PRESS BELOW 35 PSI (NO)
-- REDUCE THRUST
-- LOW OIL PRESS LIGHT ON (YES)
-- ACCOMPLISH IRR PROC FOR ENG-3 SHUTDOWN,
OR REDUCE THRUST TO MIN REQUIRED
OPTION 1: SHUTDOWN ENG-3
• CONSEQUENCE: 2 ENG AND 1 GEN OPERATING
-- LOAD < 36 KW, POSSIBLE CABIN PRESS PROBLEMS
AND HIGH RISK UNDER NIGHT CONDITIONS,
POSSIBLE FUEL UNBALANCE PROBLEM
OPTION 2: REDUCED MIN THRUST ENG-3
• CONSEQUENCE: 2 ENG AND 2 GEN OPERATING
- LOAD < 54 KW, MAX 20 MIN FLYING TIME
Candidate Scenario #2




• NEAR TOD FUEL LEAK IN TANK #3 (APPROX. 500 LB/MIN),
STOPS BELOW 1800 LBS OF FUEL
• #7 LEADING EDGE SLAT DOES NOT EXTEND
QUICK SITUATION ASSESSMENT BY CREW AND CPA
• 1000 LB FUEL TANKS 1 AND 3 DIFF (POSSIBLE
EARLIER DETECTION BY CPA)
• PRESCRIBED IRREGULAR PROCEDURE
- NONE
- VIOLATION OF FUEL UNBALANCE
SPECIFICATIONS/LIMITATIONS
FLIGHT MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES:
• VEHICLE STABILITY / CONTROLLABILITY
• LAND AT THE INTENDED DESTINATION
• POSSIBLE CONFLICT DEPENDING ON PRIORITY
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Candidate Scenario #2 (cont)
OPTION 1: PRIORITY ON VEHICLE STABILITY ONLY
• BALANCE TANK FUEL BY DUMPING FROM TANK #1
• MANAGE FUEL FLOW CONFIGURATION TO PREVENT
ENG-3 FLAMEOUT
• EVALUATE AND RECOMMEND LANDING SITE
OPTION 2: REACH DESTINATION WITH ACCEPTABLE
VEHICLE STABILITY
• PRESENT ALTERNATIVE FUEL FLOW CONFIGURATIONS
TO OPTIMIZE FUEL COMSUMPTION
• EVALUATE CONSEQUENCES OF EACH
CONFIGURATION OPTION
• RECOMMEND LANDING SITE OPTIONS
Implementation
• IMPLEMENTED ON PERSONAL COMPUTER AND VAX
WORKSTATION
• CUSTOM APPLICATION BUILT FROM GENERIC TOOLS
• OBJECT-ORIENTED REPRESENTATION:
-- AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING SYSTEMS
- ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
-- FLIGHT MANAGEMENT MODULE
-- CRITICAL FUNCTION
-- SUCCESS PATHS (PROCEDURES/CHECKLISTS)
• FRAME-BASED INFERENCING (FLIGHT MANAGEMENT/
CRITICAL FUNCTION/SUCCESS PATH EVALUATION)
- LOGIC FLOW INFERENCE ENGINE ,
- FRAMES REPRESENTED IN TERMS OF OBJECTS
-- REASONING USING FORWARD AND/OR
BACKWARD CHAINED RULES --
• INTERFACE TO AiR'RAFT OR FLIGHT SIMULATOR
• MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE:
- EASE+ - A GRAPHICAL DATA BASE
MANAGEMENT ENVlRONMEN_
- PROVIDES ENVIRONMENT FOR INTERACTION
BETWEEN USER, DATABASE, FLIGHT
MANAGEMENT MODULE AND SIMULATOR




• COMPLETE PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION OF COCKPIT
PROCEDURAL AIDS METHODOLOGY
• DEVELOP AND TEST COCKPIT PROCEDURAL AIDS





PROCEDURAL ERROR MONITORING AND
SMART CHECKLISTS
Everett Palmer
NASA Ames Research Center
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Error Detection and Correction: Self and Automatic
• Human beings make and usually detect errors routinely, The same mental processes
that allow humans to cope with novel problems can also lead to error, Bill Rouse has
argued that errors are not inherently bad but their consequences may be. He proposes
the development of "error-tolerant" systems that detect errors and take steps to prevent
the consequences of the error from occurring. Research should be done on self and
automatic detection of random and unanticipated errors. For self detection, displays should
be developed that make the consequences of errors immediately apparent. For example,
electronic map displays graphically show the consequences of horizontal flight plan entry errors.
Vertical profile displays should be developed to make apparent vertical flight planning errors.
Other concepts such as "energy circles" could also help the crew detect gross flight planning
errors. For automatic detection, systems should be developed that can track pilot activity,
infer pilot intent and inform the crew of potential errors before their consequences are
realized. Systems that perform a reasonableness check on flight plan modifications by checking
route length and magnitude of course changes are simple examples. Another example would
be a system that checked the aircraft's planned altitude against a data base of world terrain
elevations.
From: Flight Deck Automation: Promises and Realities
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PROCEDURAL ERROR MONITORING AND SMART CHECKLISTS
Error Detection & Correction: Self and Automatic
• Humans make and usually detect errors routinely.
• The same mental processes that allow humans to cope with novel problems
can also lead to error.
• Errors are not inherently bad but their consequences may be.
• "Error-Tolerant" Systems should be developed that can track pilot activity,
infer pilot intent and inform the crew of potential errors.
From: Flight Deck Automation: Promises and Realities
Research Goal
• To design systems that can infer the crew's current plan, form
expectations about future crew actions and warn the crew of possible
errors.
Approach:
• Base the system on script based AI programs that
understand human actions in stories.
• Develop a hierarchical script based program to detect
procedural errors in data form our B-727 simulator.
• Incorporate the program concepts into a "SMART
CHECKLIST" for the Advanced Cockpit Flight Simulator".
• Support Related Grant and Contract Research.
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PROCEDURAL ERROR MONITORING & SMART CHECKLISTS
OBJECTIVE
• AVIONIC SYSTEMS THAT "UNDERSTAND"
THE ACTIONS OF CREW AND CAN
INFORM CREW OF POSSIBLE ERRORS
AIRCRAFT CREW SCRIPT AIRCRAFT FLIGHT





• SCRIPT BASED MODEL
• TRACK CREW ACTIONS
• DETECT ERRORS IN B-727 SIMULATOR
• DETERMINE ERROR CONSEQUENCES
• REAL-TIME FEEDBACK
• SMART CHECKLISTS FOR THE ACFS
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
SCRIPT OF CREW ACTIVITIES
Status
• B-727 flights analysed with Version 1 of the script based
activity tracking program.
• Difficulty in dealing with actions from procedures done in
an unexpected order.
• Version 2 of the script based activity tracking program
"explains" observed actions by linking them to expected
actions in the procedure script.
• Gathered data on procedure execution in two full mission experiments
in our 727 simulator.
Plans
• Analyze 727 data from the "ATC FLOW" and "PNPS" Experiments.
• Compare program to pilot understanding of crew activity.
• Compare program to "OFMspert" developed at Georgia Tech.








• Designs are based on the Script Based Procedure Tree Architecture.
• Phase of Flight and Procedure Selection will be done Manually.
• Designs differ in the Level of Automation of procedural tasks.
• Designs differ in the Level of Involvement of the crew in the


















Before Landing - Page 2 of 2
Seat Belt Light On











Engine Bleed Air Switch .......................................................... Off
Thrust Lever .................................................... Retard
Retard slowly until ENG OVHT
light extinguishes.
Is ENG OVH light still illuminated?_ __
• Engine Failure / Shutdown
Checklist ........................................ _Acc°m_-_
Is wing anti-ice required? IYESI INOI
• One Pack Control Selector ......................... Off
• Isolation Switch (Affected Side) ............ On
Return to OFF when anti-ice is
no longer required.












PROCEDURAL ERROR MONITORING & SMART CHECKLISTS
Engine Overheat - Page 1
Engine Bleed Air Switch ............................................................. Off
Thrust I_ever.............................................................................. Retard
Retard slowly until ENG OVHT
light extinguishes.
Is ENG OVH light illuminated? [-_
• Engine Failure / Shutdown
Checklist .......................................... Accomplish
Is Wing Anti-Ice Required? _-_
• One Pack Control Selector .......................... Off
• Isolation Switch (Affected Side) ............. On
Return to OFF when anti-ice is
no longer required.












Checklist Features Experimental Conditions
• A Passive Electronic Checklist -> External Memory of completed steps.
• A Monitored Electronic Checklist -> Machine Monitoring of crew actions
• An Automatic Checklist Control -> Lower Workload
• An Automatic Execution Checklist-> Still Lower Workload
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PROCEDURAL ERROR MONITORING AND SMART CHECKLISTS
Expected Results of Research
• Reduce consequences of pilot error.
• A model of the pilot for the avionic system.
• Avionic systems that "understand" pilot intent.
• Avionic systems that knows the current context.
• A framework for electronic checklists.
• Data on human error.
Related Grants and Contracts
• "Bayesian Temporal Reasoning"
Curry, Cooper & Horvitz at Search Technology Inc.
• "Operator Function Modeling & OFMspert"
Mitchell at Georgia Institute of Technology
• "Expert Flight Systems Monitor"
Frogner, Jain & Phatac at Expert Ease Systems Inc.
• "Distributed Cognition in Aviation"
Norman & Hutchins at University of California, San Diego
• "Human Factors of Flight Deck Checklists"
Degani at University of Miami.
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PROCEDURAL ERROR MONITORING & SMART CHECKLISTS










The objective of this research is to develop the technology necessary for the design of error tolerant
cockpits. A key feature of error-tolerant systems is that they incorporate a model of pilot behavior.
The system uses this model to track pilot actions, infer pilot intent, detect unexpected actions, and
alert the crew to potential errors. In some sense, the goal is to develop an "electronic check pilot"
that can intelligently monitor pilot activities.
We are pursuing a number of alternative ways to track operator activity and infer operator intent. We
are investigating techniques based on 1) a rule based script of flight phases and procedural actions, 2)
operator function models, and 3) Bayesian temporal reasoning. The first version of the script based
program was tested against protocol data from four 727 simulator flights. The program could detect
procedural errors but its ability to account for pilot actions from procedures done out of the normal
sequence was inadequate. A capability to explain unexpected actions by linking them to procedures
that are nominally done or unstarted is being added to the program to remedy this problem. Under a
grant to Georgia Tech, an intent inferencing system based on ah operator function model was developed
and tested on data from a satellite communications system with good results. Under a contract to
Search Technology, a prototype for an intent inferencing system based on Baysian reasoning was
developed. We plan to compare these methods against data from our 727 simulator. We also plan to
initiate an empirical study designed to better understand how check pilots detect procedural errors
and infer pilot intent.
The te(:hnology developed for the "Procedural Error Monitor" will be used to develop an interactive
cockpit display to aid pilots in executing procedures. Modes of checklist operation will include both
passively monitoring pilot execution of procedures and automatically executing procedures. Under a
related SBIR contract, we will develop and test a procedure execution aid that can compose procedures




INFLIGHT REPLANNING FOR DIVERSIONS
Michael Palmer
NASA Langley Research Center
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INFLIGHT REPLANNING FOR DIVERSIONS
Current procedures for handling flight plan diversions can require too much of the crew's resources.
This increases workload and may compromise safety and cause delays in modifying the flight plan. The
goal of NASA Langley Research Center's Diverter research program is to develop guidelines for a pro-
totype pilot decision aid for diversions that will reduce cognitive workload, improve safety, increase
capacity and traffic flow, and increase aircraft efficiency. The Diverter program has been partitioned into
five phases, the first three of which were performed under contract by Lockheed Aeronautical Systems
Company, Marietta, GA. In the first two phases, which have been completed, the system requirements and
desired functions were defined and a prototype decision-making aid was implemented and demonstrated
on a workstation. In phase three, which is currently under way, the pilot/vehicle interface is being defined
and the capability of the prototype is being improved. In the last two phases, which will be performed at
NASA Langley Research Center, the interface will be implemented, tied into the prototype aiding software,
and installed in an advanced simulation facility for testing. In addition, significant implementation issues
may be addressed through flight testing on NASA research aircraft.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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PROBLEM
Current procedures for handling diversions can
require too much of the crew's resources. This
increases workload, and may compromise
safety and cause delays in modifying the flight
plan.
DIVERTER PROGRAM GOAL
Develop guidelines for and implement a prototype
pilot decision aid for diversions which will
• Reduce cognitive workload
• Improve safety
• Increase capacity & traffic flow
• Increase aircraft efficiency (time & fuel)
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DIVERTER ISSUES
• What aspects of diversion planning would benefit
the most from intelligent aiding?
• Where should diversion information be displayed?
• How should the crew interact with the system?
• How should a diversion system interact with other
aircraft systems?
• How should the system interact with existing ATC?
DIVERTER PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
• Phase 1 - Define requirements and desired functions
• Phase 2 - Develop prototype decision-making aid,
and demonstrate "stand-alone" capability
o Phase 3 - Define pilot/vehicle interface, and improve
Diverter's functional capability
o Phase 4 - Install and evaluate the aid in a realistic
flight simulation environment
O Phase 5 - Examine human-centered automation
issues through simulation, and investigate




• Determined Diverter system requirements
- Identified causes of diversions
- Identified different types of diversions
• Determined desired system functions
- Identified functions to be performed
- Identified information required to make the
necessary decisions forthose functions
> Destination selection decision factors
> Route planning/replanning decision factors
> Other information sources
CAUSES FOR DIVERSIONS
• Destination traffic
• En route traffic
• Weather





• Different departure route
• En route change to same destination
• Delaying vectors
• Holding




- Position, heading, airspeed, etc.
Evaluate influences on rerouting
- FAR's, weather, traffic, priorities, company
rules, airspace restrictions, noise abatement,
slot times
Consider system status constraints
- Aircraft systems, avionics, fuel, etc.
Perform flight planning/replanning
- Destination, route, fuel, time
Perform manuever planning










• Obstacles & terrain
• Min & max altitudes
• Distance from destination
• Aircraft status
• Current weather conditions
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PHASE 2 ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Developed prototype decision-making aid
- Selected subset of Diverter functions for
implementation
- Designed prototype decision aid using
applicable AI technology
- Implemented in Lisp on Symbolics
- Incorporated engineering interface and
explanation capability
Demonstrated "stand-alone" capability
- Demo 1: Included alternate airfield selection




- !dentify pilot information needs, and display
locations and hardware interactions
- Define specs for all required display formats
> Appearance of information on display
> Exact source, content, and organization of
required information
Improve Diverter's functional capability
- Integrate airfield selection/route replanning
- Redesign database I/O procedures to read
and write to independent data streams
217
PHASE 4 APPROACH
O Install Diverter in NASA Langley Advanced
Concepts Simulator (ACS)
- Adapt interface design as necessary
- Tie in appropriate data streams
O Evaluate aiding
scenarios














and to Inaccurate or
factor weight
incomplete data
• Examine implementation issues through flight













Based on a cognitive task analysis of 5 airline flight crews in a simulator study, we have designed
a testbed for studying computer aids for en route flight path planning. This testbed runs on a Mac II
controlling three color monitors, and is being used to study the design of aids for both dispatchers and
flight crews.
Specifically, our research focuses on design concepts for developing cooperative problem-solving
systems. We use en route flight planning (selecting alternate routes or destinations due to unanticipated
weather, traffic, malfunctions, etc.) as the context for studying the design of such systems. Flight
planning provides an interesting context because
1. Decisions must be made based on multiple competing or complementary goals.
2. Decisions are made in an information-rich environment.
3. Some of the information is available only to the flight crew (e.g., visual data or verbal reports from
other planes and air traffic control). Other information is most easily accessed or processed by the
computer.
4. Decisions must be made in a stochastic world. There is a great deal of uncertainty about future
events.
5. There is the potential to apply both knowledge-based systems and optimization approaches in the
design of computer aids.
6. Much (but not all) of the data is very graphic in nature.
We are currently exploring three questions in this test environment:
1. When interacting with a flight planning aid, how does the role of the pilot influence overall system
performance? (Should the computer aid generate and recommend full flight plans; and should it
respond to "what if" explorations by the pilot, etc.?)
2. Can the architecture for a cooperative planning system be built around Sacerdoti's (1983) concept
of an abstraction hierarchy, where the pilot can interact with the system at many different levels of
detail (but where the computer aid by default handles lower level details that the pilot has chosen
not to deal with)?
3. Can graphical displays and direct manipulation of these displays provide perceptual enhancements
(Larkin and Simon, 1987) of the pilot's problem-solving activities?
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Motivation
Use "aiding/automation only at those points in
time when human performance in a system
needs support to meet operational
requirements - in the absence of such
needs, human performance remains
unaided/manual, and thereby humans remain
very much "in the loop", (Rouse, 1988).
"Users will not accept an aiding system that
appears to usurp their authority or unduly
restricts their options", (Madni, 1988).
"The improvement of cooperative problem
solving...increases proportionately as the
degree of overlap between the user's and the
expert system's problem-solving processes
decreases; that is, with decreasing cognitive
consistency," (Lehner and Zirk, 1987).
"The user must have an accurate model of





When should we provide computerized
decisions aids?
How should these aids function?
How should the computer's functioning be
represented in the displays and controls
that the user interacts with?
Goal
To study possible answers to these
questions in the context of en route flight
planning.
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Context: En route Flight Planning
Planning must take into consideration
multiple competing and/or complementary
goals (Wilensky, 1983).




The flight crew and the computer must
share data and inferences with each other.
Such planning involves decision making
under uncertainty.
Decision making is really a group activity,
involving ATC and Dispatch as well.
GOALS
*Study issues in the design
solving systems
of cooperative problem-
*Develop and evaluate design concepts for aiding
real-time planning of flights
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Approach
*Study human performance in existing
environments
*Build a test-bed for empirically studying
alternative design concepts and principles (part-
task simulation)
*Evaluate promising concepts in full-task simulations
Flight planning TCstbed
* Calculation of optimal altitudes
* Feedback on the implications of a plan
* Ability to explore "what-it' questions
* Spreadsheet-like computations and displays
* Integration of text and graphics displays
* Graphics-based exploration of flight plans
* Easy text-based editing of plans
* Alerting functions
* Accurate map projections for the whole world
* Shared plan generation
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Flight Planning Testbed
* For studying flight crews and dispatchers
* Part-Task Simulation
* Mac II
* Up to 6 Cglor Moni!ors ....
* Mouse and Keyboard Entry
* Real-Time and Simulation-Time Clocks
Updating of Weather and Airport Statuses Over




Personalized displays to accommodate particular
circumstances and preferences
Carefully designed functional groupings
(visual displays, menus, text displays)
* Compact displays
Alternative methods of interaction (direct manipulation
with mouse or trackball vs. keyboard entry)
Develop intelligent "alarms" to focus attention on critical
data and inferences (allow the pilot to "alarm" the
computer as well?)
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Monitor for clearly questionable plans
(a critiquing system)
Allow the pilot and the computer to exchange hypotheses,
data, and inferences
Take advantage of graphics-based planning aids to provide
perceptual enhancement of problem solving
(Larkin and Simon, 1987)
Design cooperative problem-solving systems rather than
"autonomous" expert systems
* Allow pilots to ask "what if" questions
To make it easy to ask "what if" questions, structure the
architecture of the cooperative system around Sacerdoti's
notion of an abstraction hierarchy
To make it easy to ask "what if" questions, have the




Initial design concepts and implementations














RESEARCH PROGRAM IN ATC AUTOMATION
OBJECTIVE:




• TRAJECTORY PREDICTION AND CONTROL ALGORITHMS
• SCHEDULING AND SEQUENCING ALGORITHMS
• HUMAN-SYSTEM INTERFACE DESIGN




• INCREASED FUEL EFFICIENCY
• REDUCED DELAYS
• EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO CONTINGENCIES
• IMPROVED WORK ENVIRONMENT FOR CONTROLLERS
PRODUCTS
• CONCEPTS AND DESIGN METHODS FOR AUTOMATED ATC SYSTEMS
• AUTOMATION SOFTWARE
• CONTROLLER SYSTEM INTERFACE AND CONTROLLER PROCEDURES
• TESTS AND EVALUATIONS OF KEY CONCEPTS AT OPERATIONAL SITE





• CONTROLLER SYSTEM INTERFACES
• TESTS & EVALUATIONS
BROAD GUIDELINES
• CONTROLLER RESPONSIBILITIES UNCHANGED
• AUTOMATION TOOLS ASSIST BUT DO NOT
REPLACE CONTROLLER FUNCTIONS
• PROVIDE ADVISORIES FOR BOTH NORMAL AS
WELL AS ABNORMAL SITUATIONS
• CONTROLLERS DECIDE WHETHER TO USE OR
IGNORE ADVISORIES
• NO ADDITIONAL SENSORS REQUIRED ON THE GROUND
OR ONBOARD




AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL IS A TEAM PROCESS
• EACH TEAM MEMBER IS AN EXPERT IN HIS POSITION; BUT WORKS
CLOSELY WITH OTHER TEAM MEMBERS
• COMMUNICATIONS AND COORDINATION BETWEEN TEAM MEMBERS IS
A DOMINANT FEATURE
DESIGN OF AUTOMATION SYSTEM IMITATES STRUCTURE OF
MANUAL CONTROL PROCESS
• HIERARCHY OF SUPERVISION AND CONTROL
• EXPERT ADVISORS DESIGNED FOR EACH CONTROLLER POSITION


























TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT ADVISOR: WHAT IS IT?
OPTIMUM SCHEDULING ALGORITHMS
• COORDINATE AND MERGE TRAFFIC, CONFLICT FREE
• MINIMIZE AVERAGE DELAY, FCFS, ETC.
• MEET SEPARATION STANDARDS
FLOW CONTROL ALGORITHMS
• CAPACITY MANAGEMENT
• REROUTING: GATE BALANCING, FRONTAL SYSTEM AVOIDANCE,
RUNWAY CHANGE
• FLOW MONITORING
INTERACTIVE GRAPHICAL TOOLS FOR MANAGING ALGORITHMS IN
REAL TIME






































































































SCHEDULE TIMELINE ETA TIMELINE
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DESCENT ADVISOR: WHAT IS IT?
A SET OF INTERACTIVE TOOLS FOR ASSISTING CONTROLLERS IN
MANAGING ARRIVAL TRAFFIC EFFICIENTLY UNDER DIVERSE CONDITIONS,
FROM CRUISE TO FINAL APPROACH.
• FUEL OPTIMAL DESCENT ADVISORIES ADAPTED TO AIRCRAFT TYPE,
AIRLINE PREFERENCE AND WIND PROFILE.
ACCURATE TIME CONTROL AT FEEDER GATE AND ON FINAL
APPROACH:
° TOP OF DESCENT, MACH/IAS, SPEED ADVISORIES
• ON-ROUTE AND OFF-ROUTE HORIZONTAL GUIDANCE ADVISORIES




• DISTANCE SPACING MARKERS AND ADVISORIES
• TIME AT METERING FIX MARKERS AND ADVISORIES




• ROUTE INTERCEPT ADVISORIES
SPEED AND ALTITUDE PROFILE MANAGEMENT
• DESCENT SPEED (MACH/IAS PROFILE), RANGE TO TOP OF DESCENT
• CRUISE SPEED, STANDARD AIRLINE DESCENT PROFILE
• CRUISE + DESCENT
TRAJECTORY TRACKING INFORMATION
• ACCUMULATED TIME ERRORS OF "CLEARED" AIRCRAFT
• BROKEN CLEARANCE INDICATOR
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Integrated controller display illustrating waypoint capture guidance to Drako and STAs on the time line.
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FINAL APPROACH SPACING TOOL
(FAST): WHAT IS IT?
A TOOLBOX OF GRAPHICAL ADVISORIES AND
CONTROLLER SELECTABLE OPTIONS TO ASSIST
TRACON CONTROLLERS IN SEQUENCING AND SPACING
ARRIVAL TRAFFIC ON FINAL APPROACH
• ADVISORIES PROVIDED FOR ON-ROUTE AND
OFF-ROUTE AIRCRAFT
DYNAMIC RESCHEDULING AND ADVISORIES FOR ON
SCHEDULE AND OFF SCHEDULE AIRCRAFT SUCH AS

































2, ACTIVE DENVER CENTER
4, RETIRED OAKLAND
CENTER












(3 WEEKS) 6, ACTIVE OAKLANDCENTER
2, RETIRED BAY TRACON
TIME CONTROL MODE;
INTEGRATION OF 4D EQU.
AIRCRAFT;










OE POOR OUA! rrv
245
EFFECTIVENESS OF DESCENT ADVISORIES
COMPOSITE TRAJECTORIES FROM ATC SIMULATION OF DENVER AREA
• ALL ARRIVALS INITIALLY SCHEDULED CONFLICT-FREE TO TOUCHDOWN AT TOP OF DESCENT








PRIMARY BASIS FOR AUTOMATION TOOLS IS AN ACCURATE AND
VERSATILE TECHNIQUE FOR PREDICTING TRAJECTORIES AT LEAST
30 MINUTES INTO THE FUTURE
ACCURAT_E PRED!CTION TECHNIQUE IS ESSENTIAL FOR
EFFECTIVE PLANNING AND CONTROL
COMPUTER GENERATED PLANS AND ADVISORIES SHOULD NOT BE
INCOMPATIBLE WITH ACCEPTED CONTROLLER TECHNIQUES.
• TOOLS FOR ESSENTIAL CONTROLLER NEEDS TAKE
PRECEDENCE OVER TOOLS FOR FLOW OPTIMIZATION.
• AFTER MEETING ESSENTIAL NEEDS, TOOLS SHOULD HELP
MINIMIZE DELAYS AND FUEL CONSUMPTION.
• WELL DESIGNED TOOLS OFFER INTELLIGENT ADVISORIES




• DESIGN OF GRAPHICAL AND OTHER INTERFACES POSES THE MOST
DIFFICULT DESIGN CHALLENGE.
• TO BE EFFECTIVE TOOLS MUST BE CUSTOM-DESIGNED FOR EACH
TYPE OF CONTROL POSITION.
• ADVISORY TOOLS ARE A NECESSARY TRANSITONAL STEP TOWARD




TIME-BASED OPERATIONS IN AN
ADVANCED ATC ENVIRONMENT
Steven Green
NASA Ames Research Center









DEVELOP AND EVALUATE PROCEDURES AND CLEARANCES
FOR 4D EQUIPPED AIRCRAFT
STUDY THE EFFECT OF DISSIMILAR AIRBORNE AND GROUND-
BASED SPEED STRATEGIES
EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND ACCEPTABILITY OF ATC
AUTOMATION TOOLS
,,,.._',.-,..,,,_,_, PAGE _=.A,',K _"_OT F,_LI_?,ED
EXPERIMENT SET-UP
TEST SUBJECTS
- 6 ACTIVE ARTCC CONTROLLERS
- 3 AIRLINE PILOTS
SIMULATION FACILITY
- AIR TRAFFIC SIMULATION
- ATC AUTOMATION AIDS


























































CRUISE SPEED ADJUSTMEN T
TOP OF DESCENT
DESCENT SPEED PROFILE




PILOT DISCRETION CRUISE/DESCENT SPEED PROFILES




• 100 % OF SINGLE RUNWAY CAPACITY (APPROX. 40 A/C PER HOUR)
• TRAFFIC "RUSH" (80% OF ALL ARRIVALS) THROUGH KEANN (NORTHEAST GATE)
TRAFFIC THROUGH TWO ARRIVAL GATES MERGED FOR LANDING




(3 MINUTE DELAYS, SPEED CONTROL)
(8 MINUTE DELAYS, PATHSTRETCHING REQUIRED)
SINGLE 4D EQUIPPED A/C INJECTED INTO EACH RUSH
- COMPATIBLE ALGORITHMS
- INCOMPATIBLE ALGORITHMS




- 30 EXPERIMENT RUNS





"EVALUATION OF PROCEDURES/CLEARANCES FOR 4D AIRCRAFT"
THE TIME CLEARANCES AND PROCEDURES
WERE EXPLICIT AND UNDERSTANDABLE.
STRONGLY
AGREE I_
1 2 3 4 516
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
IT IS IMPORTANT TO KNOW THE 4D AIRCRAFT'S
PLANNED DESCENT STRATEGY (i.e., final cruise





"EFFECT OF DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN AIR AND GROUND SYSTEMS"
NO DIFFICULT TRAFFIC SITUATIONS AROSE
WITH THE 4D AIRCRAFT AFTER A TIME
CLEARANCE WAS ISSUED.
STRONGLY _ [] I_ STRONGLY
AGREE DISAGREE112t31415 s
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"EFFECTIVENESS/ACCEPTABILITY OF ATC AUTOMATION TOOLS"
THE VERTICAL TIMELINE PROVIDED USEFUL
INFORMATION ON THE SEQUENCE AND SCHEDULE.
THE AUTOMATION PROVIDED REASONABLE
INFORMATION UPON WHICH ONE CAN RELY.
THE AUTOMATION PROVIDES A BETTER AND
EARLIER IDEA ABOUT FUTURE CONFLICTS
AND SEPARATION AT THE METERING FIX.
IT WAS EASY TO COMBINE MY OWN SPEED,
ALTITUDE, AND VECTOR CLEARANCES WITH
THE AUTOMATION'S ADVISORIES.







111213 4 s 6
STRONGLY
AGREE _m


















@ TIME CLEARANCES AND PROCEDURES WERE USED
EFFECTIVELY BY THE CONTROLLERS
• CONTROLLERS WANT TO KNOW THE PLANNED DESCENT
STRATEGY OF 4D AIRCRAFT (SEPARATION)
• DISSIMILARITY IN SPEED STRATEGIES MAINLY AFFECT
CONTROLLER WORKLOAD AND TRAFFIC FLOW EFFICIENCY
• ATC AUTOMATION TOOLS PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE AID
FOR THE SEQUENCING OF ARRIVAL FLOWS




TEST SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE SYSTEM EFFICIENCY AND
REDUCE WORKLOAD FOR DISSIMILARITY CASES :
-CONFLICT DETECTION / RESOLUTION AIDS
-SEPARATION PROCEDURES / CRITERIA FOR 4D
EXPLORE DATA LINK APPLICATIONS TO REDUCE
COMMUNICATIONS WORKLOAD FOR TIME-BASED OP'S.
DETERMINE ATMOSPHERIC AND PERFORMANCE MODELLING
REQUIREMENTS






NASA Langley Research Center
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LANGLEY RESEARCH AMES RESEARCH
STUDY OBJECTIVES
f
• DEVELOP AND EVALUATE PROCEDURES FOR INCORPORATING
4D-EQUIPPED AIRCRAFT INTO A 4D ATC SYSTEM
• DETERMINE IMPACT ON THE SYSTEM OF DISSIMILAR AIRBORNE
AND GROUND 4D SPEED STRATEGIES
• EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIRBORNE TIME GUIDANCE
J
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NASA TSRV 4D FMS CAPABILITIES
T_RAJECTORY GENERATION
HORIZONTAL ROUTE DEFINED THROUGH FLEXIBLE CDU OPERATIONS.
(COMPARABLE TO B-737-400)
VERTICAL TRAJECTORY GENERATION WITH ARRIVAL TIME CONSTRAINT.
- MINIMUM FUEL
- ATC DESCENT ADVISOR
AUTOMATIC RECALCULATION CAPABILITY.
4D GUIDANCE
VERTICAL SITUATION DISPLAY WITH TIME CAPABILITIES SHOWN AT ARRIVAL FIX.
TIME-BASED ENERGY ERROR DISPLAY.
J
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TSRV VERTICAL SITUATION DISPLAY






ETA 18:14:39 EARLY 6
, i===l ,_:_ , , J=_ MAXTIME














MINTIMEI II i I ,,_I__t_Z_ MAX TIME18:11:28 _ 18:18:25
RTA 18:14:45 KEANN







- ENTER ARRIVAL TIME
- EXECUTE NEW VERTICAL PROFILE
- ADVISE ATC OF SPEED CHANGE
TIME DELAY VECTOR
- ACKNOWLEDGE ATC
- FLY ATC-SPECIFIED VECTOR AT MINIMUM SPEED
- ADVISE ATC OF SPEED CHANGE
- ENTER ARRIVAL TIME
- SELECT DIRECT INTERCEPT OF ATC-SPECIFIED WAYPOINT
<< AUTOMA TIC PROFILE RECALCULATION >>
- EXECUTE NEW PROFILE WHEN TIME DELAY COMPLETE





SCOTTSBLUFF FL310, .74 MACH
o 210 NMI FROM DEN




METERING FIX I i , , i i
11000', 210 KIAS





















X X X X
X
6 9 4 7
RESULTS
TIME CLEARANCES, PROCEDURES AND DISPLAYS
WELL RECEIVED BY PILOTS
DISSIMILAR AIR AND GROUND SPEED STRATEGIES PRODUCED
POTENTIAL TRAFFIC CONFLICTS DURING MODERATE TRAFFIC
- ATC VECTORS AND ROUTE-OFFSET PROVED LESS EFFICIENT
- CRUISE SPEED RESTRICTION COULD ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM
TIME DELAY VECTOR USEFUL DURING HEAVY TRAFFIC
- POTENTIAL FOR RELIEVING CONTROLLER WORKLOAD
- ALLOWS AIRCRAFT TO MINIMIZE DELAY RANGE
- DISSIMILAR SPEEDS NOT A PROBLEM
• TIME GUIDANCE PROVED VERY EFFECTIVE
- ARRIVAL TIME ERROR OF 2.9 SECONDS (STANDARD DEVIATION)
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o--o dissimilar speeds
._ e--e similar speeds
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In-trail Separation, nautical miles
En route separation for 32 minute flight time with 80 seconds in-trail separation at initial and final conditions



























TEST PROCEDURAL SOLUTIONS TO COMPATIBILITY
PROBLEMS OF DISSIMILAR SPEED STRATEGIES
EXPLORE DATA LINK APPLICATIONS
- UPLINK OF CLEARANCES AND SPEED CONSTRAINTS
- DOWNLtNK OF PLANNED SPEED SCHEDULE AND TOP OF DESCENT
• INTEGRATE TIME GUIDANCE INTO PRIMARY DISPLAYS
• DETERMINE WIND AND TEMPERATURE MODELING
REQUIREMENTS
TEST SCENARIOS WITH MULTIPLE 4D AIRCRAFT j
SUMMARY
f
• AIRBORNE 4D CAN BE EFFECTIVELY INTEGRATED
INTO AN ADVANCED 4D ATC SYSTEM
• DIFFERENCES IN 4D SPEED STRATEGIES CAN BE
MANAGED WITH PROCEDURAL SOLUTIONS
• TIME GUIDANCE CONCEPTS VERY EFFECTIVE
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Since the mid-1960's, microburst/windshear events have caused at least 30 aircraft accidents and
incidents and have killed more than 600 people in the United States alone. This study evaluated
alternative means of alerting an airline crew to the presence of microburst/windshear events in the
terminal area. Of particular interest was the relative effectiveness of conventional and data link
ground-to-air transmissions of ground-based radar and low-level windshear sensing information on
microburst/windshear avoidance. The Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator located at Ames Research
Center was employed in a line oriented simulation of a scheduled round-trip airline flight from Salt
Lake City to Denver Stapleton Airport. Actual weather en route and in the terminal area was simulated
using recorded data. The microburst/windshear incident of July 11, 1988 was re-created for the Denver
area operations. Six experienced airline crews currently flying scheduled routes were employed as test
subjects for each of three groups: a) A baseline group which received alerts via conventional ATC tower
transmissions, b) An experimental group which received alerts/events displayed visually and aurally in
the cockpit six miles (approx. 2 min.) from the microburst event, and c) An additional experimental
group received displayed alerts/events 23 linear miles (approx. 7 min.) from the microburst event.
Analyses of crew communications and decision times showed a marked improvement in both situation
awareness and decision-making with visually displayed ground-based radar information. Substantial
reductions in the variability of decision times among crews in the visual display groups were also
found. These findings suggest that crew performance will be enhanced and individual differences
among crews due to differences in training and prior experience are significantly reduced by providing
real-time, graphic display of terminal weather hazards.
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TERMINAL WEATHER INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
TWIM COCKPIT DISPLAY
[d, iEROBURST ALERT 26 L [] 60
50 KT LOSS - 2 r-'ILE FINAL [] 3C_
DENVER STAPLETON TERMli'4AL AR£A
ENHANCED AIRCREW DECISION-MAKING
LOCATION AT WHICH GO:AROUND WAS INITIATED
WITH:
O VISUAL DISPLAY • ATC VOICE ALERT
OM
ALERT MICROBURST
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MEAN PERCENT
CONCLUSION: Displays of ground-based
terminal weather data enhance
crew avoidance of microburst/
windshear events.
IMPACT: Relatively low-cost technology
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• Cockpit Information Management
- Problem
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Information Management
Problem with the PFD
Increased amounts of information on the






Decrease the quantity of information on the
PFD. by presenting only the information





Status of the PFD
Information Management Work
• Validated the implementation and integration
of TTFIM during June 1989 flight tests
• Completed implementation of automatic flight
phase detection KBS and scheduled for
validation during November 1989 flight tests
Evaluation of the functional and operational








• Cockpit Information Management
- Problem






Problem in the Cockpit
Large quantities of information currently compete
for the attention of flight crews, and the amount of
information is expected to increase
Information Management
Burdens
Auditory • ground control communications
• aircraft-to-aircraft communications
• intercrew dialogues
• electronically generated speech and
tone signals
Visual • radar signatures
• multiple display configurations
• number of displays
Cognitive • control mode configurations
• cooperative action of independent,
interactive agents
• periods of situation monitoring with





Exploretechniquesthat present information _
in a manner that exploits the capabilities the
flight crew brings to the cockpit
Key Characteristics of an
Information Manager
• Manage several media/formats
• Integrate across several programs and data
sources
• Consider both pilot workload and tasking
• Factor in the information demands of the systems
Account for the interactions among human
performance variables, equipment characteristics,
and mission/environment imposed demands
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Technical Issues
• How do we prioritize information?
How should new information be melded
with old information?
How will the content of each possible
piece of information and its potential
impact be evaluated?
How are priorities ranked relative to
goals (mission, tactical, safety)?
How are the priorities of old messages
changed?
• What information sources should be included?
• What hardware and software architectures are
suited for supporting information management?
• What kind of feedback from the aircrew is
necessary?
• How will it support muitimember crews?
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COCKPIT INFORMATION MANAGEMENT APPROACH
• Survey the Current State-of-Cockpit Information Environment
- Identify Management Principles to be Invoiced Near/Long Term
• Abstract Current Information Flow for Designated Flight Phases
• Provide Functional Decomposition for Communication Management
• Design Architecture for Expert Assistance
1. Prioritize
2. Compose




° Flight Phase and Aircraft Situation Responsiveness
• Flight Crew Responsive Display Configuration
• Prioritization and Composition of Information
° Facility for Storage, Retrieval, Review and Repetition
of Information
284
COCKPIT INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM:
FUNCTION
Integrate Information Across Avionics Devices and Data Sources
so that One Interface Provides Full Access to Systems
Integrate Presentation Across Display Modalities so that the
System Can Manage Several Formats for Information Display
COCKPIT INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
IMPLEMENTATION STAGES
° Specification of Message Interactions that is Format Independent
• Develop Functional Knowledge Base of Information Exchange
Requirements and Dialogue Structures
• Abstract Characterization of Data Types, Sensor Systems, and
Communications Links






THE INTERFACE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANAGES
THE FLOW OF INFORMATION AND THE DIALOGS























































ANALYSIS ! MONI'rORING INTERNAL
EXPERT SYSTEMS REPRESENTATIONS
SYSTEM AIRCRAFT MODEL

















• Assumptions/Abstraction of Components














Comparison of the Conceptual Model or System
Design to the Software that Implements that
Design
Determination Of the Accuracy with Which the
Model or System Captures the Function of
the Real World Operation
Comparison of the Target System's Operation
to Current or Alternative Systems
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wN91-10962
A FLIGHT TEST FACILITY DESIGN FOR
EXAMINING DIGITAL INFORMATION TRANSFER
Charles E. Knox
NASA Langley Research Center
289
2
AIRCRAFT / GROUND INFORMATION
EXCHANGE
OBJECTIVE: EXPLORE AND DEFINE INTERFACE / MESSAGE
CONCEPTS FOR EFFECTIVE INFORMATION





• DATA BASE COMPATIBILITY
• OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
NASA LaRC
DATA LINK RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
PRIMARY DIRECTION: ATC/WEATHER COMMUNICATIONS
== SINGLE PILOT IFR PROGRAM
o FLIGHT EVALUATION -- CR-3461 / CR-3653
o SIMULATOR INVESTIGATION -- TP-2837
•" DEVELOPMENT OF AN AIR GROUND DATA EXCHANGE CONCEPT:
o FLIGHT DECK PERSPECTIVE -- CR-4074
o ATC GROUND PERSPECTIVE-- BEING DRAFTED
== NASA ATOPS COMMERCIAL JET TRANSPORT OPERATIONS
o INITIAL PILOTED SIMULATION -- TP-2859
o TOUCH PANEL/COMPUTERIZED VOICE INTERFACE -- PILOTED
SIMULATION -- COMPLETED
o TYPICAL AIRLINE MISSION FLIGHT PROFILE -- FLIGHT TEST -- NOV '89
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DATA LINK RESEARCH SETUP
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INITIAL TSRV
DATA LINK FLIGHT TEST
TEST OBJECTIVE: COMPARISON OF CURRENT VOICE
COMMUNICATIONS TO DIGITAL INFORMATION TRANSFER
FOR AN EFIS-EQUIPPED TRANSPORT AIRPLANE DURING
FULL MISSION SCENARIO TYPICAL OF COMMERCIAL
AIRLINE FLIGHT OPERATIONS
SPECIFIC FOCUS:
o ADVANCED DATA LINK/CREW INTERFACE DESIGN
o CREW ACCEPTANCE AND PERCEIVED WORKLOAD
o ROUND-TRIP COMMUNICATION RESPONSE TIME




o VOICE RADIO ONLY
o DATA LINK WITH CRT DISPLAY
+ VOICE RADIO BACKUP
DATA LINK WITH CRT DISPLAY
+ COMPUTERIZED VOICE OF DATA LINK MESSAGE
+ VOICE RADIO BACKUP
TYPE OF COMMUNICATIONS MESSAGES"
VOICE TRANSMISSIONS
- ATC SIGN-ON - TRAFFIC CALLS
- URGENT - NEGOTIATIONS
DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS
- ATC TACTICAL - ATC STRATEGIC
- INFORMATION (ATC, WEATHER, ATIS, NASA GROUND)
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FLIGHT TEST SETUP - (CONC)
FLIGHT PROFILE:
o TAKEOFF AND LANDING AT NASA WALLOPS FLIGHT
FACILITY
o THREE PHASE FLIGHT PATH (~250 NM)
- TAKEOFF AND CLIMB
- ABBREVIATED CRUISE
- DESCENT AND LANDING
TEST SUBJECTS:
O COMMERCIAL LINE PILOTS
DATA COLLECTION"
o PILOT COMMENTS, QUESTIONNAIRE, DEBRIEFING
o SWAT
o MESSAGE AND TRANSMISSION/RESPONSE TIMES
o AIRPLANE STATE AND FMS AND FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
CONFIGURATION
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